The Prima Facie View of Perceptual Imagination
Perception is said to have assertoric force: It inclines the perceiver to believe its content. In contrast, perceptual imagination is commonly taken to be non-assertoric: Imagining winning a piano contest does not incline the imaginer to believe they actually won. However, abundant evidence from cli...
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| Language: | English |
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Michigan Publishing
2025-04-01
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| Series: | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/7306/ |
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| _version_ | 1849703426237136896 |
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| author | Andrea Rivadulla-Duró |
| author_facet | Andrea Rivadulla-Duró |
| author_sort | Andrea Rivadulla-Duró |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Perception is said to have assertoric force: It inclines the perceiver to believe its content. In contrast, perceptual imagination is commonly taken to be non-assertoric: Imagining winning a piano contest does not incline the imaginer to believe they actually won. However, abundant evidence from clinical and experimental psychology shows that imagination influences attitudes and behavior in ways similar to perceptual experiences. To account for these phenomena, I propose that perceptual imaginings have implicit assertoric force and put forth a theory—the Prima Facie View—as a unified explanation for the empirical findings reviewed. According to this view, mental images are treated as percepts in operations involving associative memory. Finally, I address alternative explanations that could account for the reviewed empirical evidence—such as a Spinozian model of belief formation or Gendler’s notion of alief—as well as potential objections to the Prima Facie View. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-85e6ad01e0634c8bb6cbfffd4846fce6 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2330-4014 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-04-01 |
| publisher | Michigan Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-85e6ad01e0634c8bb6cbfffd4846fce62025-08-20T03:17:18ZengMichigan PublishingErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy2330-40142025-04-0112010.3998/ergo.7306The Prima Facie View of Perceptual ImaginationAndrea Rivadulla-Duró0LOGOS Research Group in Analytic Philosophy, Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaPerception is said to have assertoric force: It inclines the perceiver to believe its content. In contrast, perceptual imagination is commonly taken to be non-assertoric: Imagining winning a piano contest does not incline the imaginer to believe they actually won. However, abundant evidence from clinical and experimental psychology shows that imagination influences attitudes and behavior in ways similar to perceptual experiences. To account for these phenomena, I propose that perceptual imaginings have implicit assertoric force and put forth a theory—the Prima Facie View—as a unified explanation for the empirical findings reviewed. According to this view, mental images are treated as percepts in operations involving associative memory. Finally, I address alternative explanations that could account for the reviewed empirical evidence—such as a Spinozian model of belief formation or Gendler’s notion of alief—as well as potential objections to the Prima Facie View.https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/7306/perceptual imaginationsensory imaginationmental imagerybeliefassociationSpinozian Model of belief |
| spellingShingle | Andrea Rivadulla-Duró The Prima Facie View of Perceptual Imagination Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy perceptual imagination sensory imagination mental imagery belief association Spinozian Model of belief |
| title | The Prima Facie View of Perceptual Imagination |
| title_full | The Prima Facie View of Perceptual Imagination |
| title_fullStr | The Prima Facie View of Perceptual Imagination |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Prima Facie View of Perceptual Imagination |
| title_short | The Prima Facie View of Perceptual Imagination |
| title_sort | prima facie view of perceptual imagination |
| topic | perceptual imagination sensory imagination mental imagery belief association Spinozian Model of belief |
| url | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/7306/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT andrearivadulladuro theprimafacieviewofperceptualimagination AT andrearivadulladuro primafacieviewofperceptualimagination |