Normative decision theory and reindividuation of the outcomes
This article examines and critiques efforts to preserve the requirements of normative decision theory from counterexamples by reindividuating outcomes. Reindividuation is often employed in response to counterexamples that challenge even the most fundamental requirements of rationality, su...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2024/0353-57382404933F.pdf |
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| Summary: | This article examines and critiques efforts to preserve the requirements of
normative decision theory from counterexamples by reindividuating outcomes.
Reindividuation is often employed in response to counterexamples that
challenge even the most fundamental requirements of rationality, such as
transitivity. These counterexamples demonstrate that even basic rationality
requirements can appear to be violated in seemingly rational ways, thus
casting doubt on their plausibility. Reindividuation seeks to preserve
these requirements by refining the objects of preference in more detailed
terms. However, John Broome has pointed out that this strategy can lead to
the issue of making the requirements vacuous. We will explore
counterexamples to transitivity and demonstrate how reindividuation can lead
to this problem of emptiness. Following that, we will review significant
attempts to address this problem, showing that they fall short and that any
direction we take either makes the requirements too permissive or leaves
them unjustified. In the final section, we suggest a less conventional
solution: rejecting finer individuation and accepting that the requirements
of rationality are not universal. Finally, we point out several established
approaches to decision theory that allow for domain-specific requirements. |
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| ISSN: | 0353-5738 2334-8577 |