Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-Echelon Newsvendor Model with Rapidly Responsive and Strategic Consumers
Aiming at the two-echelon newsvendor problem in which the market demand of commodities is random both in normal sales period and in liquidation period, this paper studies the pricing and ordering decision of retailers by using rational expectation equilibrium under the condition of considering consu...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2021-01-01
|
| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5578752 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1850214032264396800 |
|---|---|
| author | Dai Dai Xinyu Gou Qiang Wei |
| author_facet | Dai Dai Xinyu Gou Qiang Wei |
| author_sort | Dai Dai |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Aiming at the two-echelon newsvendor problem in which the market demand of commodities is random both in normal sales period and in liquidation period, this paper studies the pricing and ordering decision of retailers by using rational expectation equilibrium under the condition of considering consumersʼ strategic behavior and rapid response mechanism. Then, the decision-making problem under retailersʼ initial order quantity commitment is discussed, as well as the effect of commitment mechanism on supply chain performance. On this basis, both the two-part pricing contract and revenue-sharing contract are introduced to achieve supply chain coordination aiming at the profit maximization under the initial order quantity commitment mechanism. The results show that the rapid response mechanism can reduce the negative impact of consumers’ strategic behavior, and the initial order quantity commitment can further reduce the impact and improve the retailers’ profit. Both the two-part pricing contract and revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the whole supply chain in which the two-part pricing contract can distribute profit arbitrarily between manufacturers and retailers while the revenue-sharing contract can share risks among members of the supply chain. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-83389a894e474bdd838956c70d342f83 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-83389a894e474bdd838956c70d342f832025-08-20T02:09:00ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262021-01-01202110.1155/2021/55787525578752Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-Echelon Newsvendor Model with Rapidly Responsive and Strategic ConsumersDai Dai0Xinyu Gou1Qiang Wei2School of Economic Mathematics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, ChinaSchool of Business Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, ChinaSchool of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, ChinaAiming at the two-echelon newsvendor problem in which the market demand of commodities is random both in normal sales period and in liquidation period, this paper studies the pricing and ordering decision of retailers by using rational expectation equilibrium under the condition of considering consumersʼ strategic behavior and rapid response mechanism. Then, the decision-making problem under retailersʼ initial order quantity commitment is discussed, as well as the effect of commitment mechanism on supply chain performance. On this basis, both the two-part pricing contract and revenue-sharing contract are introduced to achieve supply chain coordination aiming at the profit maximization under the initial order quantity commitment mechanism. The results show that the rapid response mechanism can reduce the negative impact of consumers’ strategic behavior, and the initial order quantity commitment can further reduce the impact and improve the retailers’ profit. Both the two-part pricing contract and revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the whole supply chain in which the two-part pricing contract can distribute profit arbitrarily between manufacturers and retailers while the revenue-sharing contract can share risks among members of the supply chain.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5578752 |
| spellingShingle | Dai Dai Xinyu Gou Qiang Wei Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-Echelon Newsvendor Model with Rapidly Responsive and Strategic Consumers Complexity |
| title | Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-Echelon Newsvendor Model with Rapidly Responsive and Strategic Consumers |
| title_full | Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-Echelon Newsvendor Model with Rapidly Responsive and Strategic Consumers |
| title_fullStr | Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-Echelon Newsvendor Model with Rapidly Responsive and Strategic Consumers |
| title_full_unstemmed | Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-Echelon Newsvendor Model with Rapidly Responsive and Strategic Consumers |
| title_short | Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-Echelon Newsvendor Model with Rapidly Responsive and Strategic Consumers |
| title_sort | coordination mechanisms for the two echelon newsvendor model with rapidly responsive and strategic consumers |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5578752 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT daidai coordinationmechanismsforthetwoechelonnewsvendormodelwithrapidlyresponsiveandstrategicconsumers AT xinyugou coordinationmechanismsforthetwoechelonnewsvendormodelwithrapidlyresponsiveandstrategicconsumers AT qiangwei coordinationmechanismsforthetwoechelonnewsvendormodelwithrapidlyresponsiveandstrategicconsumers |