Evolutional Game Analysis of Quality Regulation of a Blockchain Platform for Emergency Material Security in Emergencies Based on Prospect Theory
To enhance the security and supervision of emergency materials from their source to transport, thus preventing safety incidents, a tripartite evolution model integrating the government, material production enterprises, and logistics entities is proposed. This model, situated within the framework of...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2025-02-01
|
| Series: | Systems |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/13/2/130 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | To enhance the security and supervision of emergency materials from their source to transport, thus preventing safety incidents, a tripartite evolution model integrating the government, material production enterprises, and logistics entities is proposed. This model, situated within the framework of a government-established blockchain platform, combines evolutionary game theory and prospect theory. It examines the strategy evolution of emergency material’s security subjects amid diverse government reward punishment measures and enterprise risk perceptions. Our findings indicate that employing dynamic reward–punishment measures not only conserves government regulatory resources but also incentivizes enterprises to enhance the quality of emergency materials security. This dynamic approach effectively encourages responsible behavior, averting rebellious tendencies or speculative mindsets in enterprises with deviating risk perceptions regarding emergency materials security. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2079-8954 |