How we can be free: Kant and the deduction of the moral law
The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason contain two different attempts to provide a "deduction" or foundation for the categorical imperative. Kant does not doubt that the categorical imperative is a principle of practical reason; instead, he raises...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Philosophy
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Belgrade Philosophical Annual |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912403007K.pdf |
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| Summary: | The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason contain two different attempts to provide a "deduction" or foundation for the categorical imperative. Kant does not doubt that the categorical imperative is a principle of practical reason; instead, he raises questions about how it can be normative for us, because he wonders how "pure practical reason" can motivate us. But he has no such worry about the hypothetical imperative, which he thinks draws on empirical sources of motivation. I argue that this contrast is based on a mistake about the normativity of hypothetical imperatives. Both categorical and hypothetical imperatives arise from the nature of action as rational causality. Conformity to both imperatives is therefore constitutive of action. Although we may doubt whether we are genuinely active rational beings in general, the fact that we must act under the idea of freedom shows why we must conceive ourselves as bound by the imperatives. Insofar as we can therefore act on the imperatives, we really are free. |
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| ISSN: | 0353-3891 2956-0357 |