Demographic Optimum in the Context of Migration. The German Case
The study aims to test whether the unbalanced structure of indigenous workforce offer in developed economies, such as Germany, originates both in the structure of rewards associated with each type of job in accordance with the required education level and also in the algorithm of their allocation so...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Editura ASE
2017-08-01
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| Series: | Amfiteatru Economic |
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| Online Access: | http://www.amfiteatrueconomic.ro/temp/Article_2649.pdf |
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| author | Ion Pohoaţă Vladimir-Mihai Crupenschi Gabriel Căriman |
| author_facet | Ion Pohoaţă Vladimir-Mihai Crupenschi Gabriel Căriman |
| author_sort | Ion Pohoaţă |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The study aims to test whether the unbalanced structure of indigenous workforce offer in developed economies, such as Germany, originates both in the structure of rewards associated with each type of job in accordance with the required education level and also in the algorithm of their allocation so that the economy’s workforce demand is met. The structural disequilibrium of the workforce offer reflected in the scarcity of workforce members which have attained only a primary education level determines the need to supplement indigenous labour force by accepting and even encouraging immigration. The goal of using game theory as methodology is to estimate the strategy of player P1 (considered to be the individual agent) in choosing a specific level of education, while taking into account the choices of future competitors on the labour market – associated in the game with collective player P2. The resulted Nash equilibrium leads to the conclusion that an individual player, to the extent of approximately 40%, chooses to pursue a superior level of education (tertiary), while more than 95% out of total competitors opt for a similar level of education. Therefore, any version of demographic optimum for Germany, built on the principle of economic efficiency cannot afford to ignore the contribution of immigrants towards achieving the required workforce level. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-7f67ca3fe3444856b7409b4885424cb7 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 1582-9146 2247-9104 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2017-08-01 |
| publisher | Editura ASE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Amfiteatru Economic |
| spelling | doaj-art-7f67ca3fe3444856b7409b4885424cb72025-08-20T03:06:44ZengEditura ASEAmfiteatru Economic1582-91462247-91042017-08-011946654669Demographic Optimum in the Context of Migration. The German CaseIon Pohoaţă0Vladimir-Mihai Crupenschi1Gabriel Căriman 2Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, Romania Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, Romania Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, Romania The study aims to test whether the unbalanced structure of indigenous workforce offer in developed economies, such as Germany, originates both in the structure of rewards associated with each type of job in accordance with the required education level and also in the algorithm of their allocation so that the economy’s workforce demand is met. The structural disequilibrium of the workforce offer reflected in the scarcity of workforce members which have attained only a primary education level determines the need to supplement indigenous labour force by accepting and even encouraging immigration. The goal of using game theory as methodology is to estimate the strategy of player P1 (considered to be the individual agent) in choosing a specific level of education, while taking into account the choices of future competitors on the labour market – associated in the game with collective player P2. The resulted Nash equilibrium leads to the conclusion that an individual player, to the extent of approximately 40%, chooses to pursue a superior level of education (tertiary), while more than 95% out of total competitors opt for a similar level of education. Therefore, any version of demographic optimum for Germany, built on the principle of economic efficiency cannot afford to ignore the contribution of immigrants towards achieving the required workforce level.http://www.amfiteatrueconomic.ro/temp/Article_2649.pdfdemographic optimumNash equilibriummigration |
| spellingShingle | Ion Pohoaţă Vladimir-Mihai Crupenschi Gabriel Căriman Demographic Optimum in the Context of Migration. The German Case Amfiteatru Economic demographic optimum Nash equilibrium migration |
| title | Demographic Optimum in the Context of Migration. The German Case |
| title_full | Demographic Optimum in the Context of Migration. The German Case |
| title_fullStr | Demographic Optimum in the Context of Migration. The German Case |
| title_full_unstemmed | Demographic Optimum in the Context of Migration. The German Case |
| title_short | Demographic Optimum in the Context of Migration. The German Case |
| title_sort | demographic optimum in the context of migration the german case |
| topic | demographic optimum Nash equilibrium migration |
| url | http://www.amfiteatrueconomic.ro/temp/Article_2649.pdf |
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