Low-Carbon Optimization Scheduling of Integrated Energy Systems Based on Bilateral Demand Response and Two-Level Stackelberg Game
In the context of low-carbon energy transformation, fully utilizing the integrated demand response (IDR) resources on the load side can improve the operational flexibility and economy of the integrated energy system (IES). However, establishing a reasonable trading mechanism to enhance users’ partic...
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MDPI AG
2024-11-01
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| Series: | Energies |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/21/5491 |
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| author | Hua Pan Qunli Wu Huiling Guo Jiayi Bai |
| author_facet | Hua Pan Qunli Wu Huiling Guo Jiayi Bai |
| author_sort | Hua Pan |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the context of low-carbon energy transformation, fully utilizing the integrated demand response (IDR) resources on the load side can improve the operational flexibility and economy of the integrated energy system (IES). However, establishing a reasonable trading mechanism to enhance users’ participation in IDR has become a key issue that IES urgently needs to solve. To this end, this paper first establishes an IES model that includes electricity, heat, and gas. To reduce carbon emissions, a ladder-type carbon trading mechanism is introduced while adding low-carbon technologies such as carbon capture devices and power-to-gas conversion. Secondly, a bilateral IDR mechanism centered on the load aggregator (LA) is proposed, and a multi-agent operation model including IES, LA, and users is established. The IDR subsidy price is dynamically determined through a two-level Stackelberg game model involving IES, LA, and users. Then, through KKT conditions and the Big M method, the two-level game model is turned into an IES-LA game model, which is solved using a combination of the White Shark Optimization method and the Gurobi solver. The final simulation results show that the scheduling model can fully reflect the time value of IDR resources, and the IES cost is decreased by USD 152.22, while LA and user benefits are increased by USD 54.61 and USD 31.85. Meanwhile, the ladder-type carbon trading mechanism and low-carbon technology have effectively achieved low-carbon operation of the system. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-7f59c3e860194adea15908430ceb9dc3 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 1996-1073 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-11-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Energies |
| spelling | doaj-art-7f59c3e860194adea15908430ceb9dc32025-08-20T02:49:49ZengMDPI AGEnergies1996-10732024-11-011721549110.3390/en17215491Low-Carbon Optimization Scheduling of Integrated Energy Systems Based on Bilateral Demand Response and Two-Level Stackelberg GameHua Pan0Qunli Wu1Huiling Guo2Jiayi Bai3CHN ENERGY Investment Group Co., Ltd., Beijing 100011, ChinaDepartment of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Baoding 071003, ChinaDepartment of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Baoding 071003, ChinaDepartment of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Baoding 071003, ChinaIn the context of low-carbon energy transformation, fully utilizing the integrated demand response (IDR) resources on the load side can improve the operational flexibility and economy of the integrated energy system (IES). However, establishing a reasonable trading mechanism to enhance users’ participation in IDR has become a key issue that IES urgently needs to solve. To this end, this paper first establishes an IES model that includes electricity, heat, and gas. To reduce carbon emissions, a ladder-type carbon trading mechanism is introduced while adding low-carbon technologies such as carbon capture devices and power-to-gas conversion. Secondly, a bilateral IDR mechanism centered on the load aggregator (LA) is proposed, and a multi-agent operation model including IES, LA, and users is established. The IDR subsidy price is dynamically determined through a two-level Stackelberg game model involving IES, LA, and users. Then, through KKT conditions and the Big M method, the two-level game model is turned into an IES-LA game model, which is solved using a combination of the White Shark Optimization method and the Gurobi solver. The final simulation results show that the scheduling model can fully reflect the time value of IDR resources, and the IES cost is decreased by USD 152.22, while LA and user benefits are increased by USD 54.61 and USD 31.85. Meanwhile, the ladder-type carbon trading mechanism and low-carbon technology have effectively achieved low-carbon operation of the system.https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/21/5491bilateral demand responsetwo-level Stackelberg gamecarbon capturepower to gas |
| spellingShingle | Hua Pan Qunli Wu Huiling Guo Jiayi Bai Low-Carbon Optimization Scheduling of Integrated Energy Systems Based on Bilateral Demand Response and Two-Level Stackelberg Game Energies bilateral demand response two-level Stackelberg game carbon capture power to gas |
| title | Low-Carbon Optimization Scheduling of Integrated Energy Systems Based on Bilateral Demand Response and Two-Level Stackelberg Game |
| title_full | Low-Carbon Optimization Scheduling of Integrated Energy Systems Based on Bilateral Demand Response and Two-Level Stackelberg Game |
| title_fullStr | Low-Carbon Optimization Scheduling of Integrated Energy Systems Based on Bilateral Demand Response and Two-Level Stackelberg Game |
| title_full_unstemmed | Low-Carbon Optimization Scheduling of Integrated Energy Systems Based on Bilateral Demand Response and Two-Level Stackelberg Game |
| title_short | Low-Carbon Optimization Scheduling of Integrated Energy Systems Based on Bilateral Demand Response and Two-Level Stackelberg Game |
| title_sort | low carbon optimization scheduling of integrated energy systems based on bilateral demand response and two level stackelberg game |
| topic | bilateral demand response two-level Stackelberg game carbon capture power to gas |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/21/5491 |
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