Deterrence of Punitive Measures on Collusive Bidding in the Construction Sector
Collusive bidding has been a deep-seated issue in the construction market for a long time. The strategies implemented by bid riggers are deliberate, interactive, and complex, suggesting that antitrust authorities have difficulty preventing collusive behaviors. Based on game payoff matrixes, this stu...
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9913413 |
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| _version_ | 1850215156890468352 |
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| author | Wenhui Zhu Yuhang Zheng Kunhui Ye Qian Zhang Minjie Zhang |
| author_facet | Wenhui Zhu Yuhang Zheng Kunhui Ye Qian Zhang Minjie Zhang |
| author_sort | Wenhui Zhu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Collusive bidding has been a deep-seated issue in the construction market for a long time. The strategies implemented by bid riggers are deliberate, interactive, and complex, suggesting that antitrust authorities have difficulty preventing collusive behaviors. Based on game payoff matrixes, this study proposes a system dynamics (SD) model to present the deterrence of punitive measures, namely the certainty of punishment (CoP) and the severity of punishment (SoP), on regular bidders’ to-collude decision-making. Data were collected from the Chinese construction industry to test the proposed SD model. While the model was supported, the results indicate that the CoP has a greater impact than the SoP on deterring regular bidders from making to-collude decisions. Furthermore, these two punitive measures cannot be replaced by each other, given the same deterrence effects. Thus, the study demonstrates the usefulness of deterrence theory to inhibit collusive bidding in the construction sector. It also sheds some light on the formulation of competition policy from the perspective of deterrence. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-7e3f21aafada4192a4ebf2a54844058f |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-7e3f21aafada4192a4ebf2a54844058f2025-08-20T02:08:42ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262021-01-01202110.1155/2021/99134139913413Deterrence of Punitive Measures on Collusive Bidding in the Construction SectorWenhui Zhu0Yuhang Zheng1Kunhui Ye2Qian Zhang3Minjie Zhang4School of Management Science and Real Estate, Chongqing University, 83# Shabei Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing 400045, ChinaSchool of Management Science and Real Estate, Chongqing University, 83# Shabei Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing 400045, ChinaInternational Research Center for Sustainable Construction, Chongqing University, 83# Shabei Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing 400045, ChinaSchool of Management Science and Real Estate, Chongqing University, 83# Shabei Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing 400045, ChinaSchool of Management Science and Real Estate, Chongqing University, 83# Shabei Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing 400045, ChinaCollusive bidding has been a deep-seated issue in the construction market for a long time. The strategies implemented by bid riggers are deliberate, interactive, and complex, suggesting that antitrust authorities have difficulty preventing collusive behaviors. Based on game payoff matrixes, this study proposes a system dynamics (SD) model to present the deterrence of punitive measures, namely the certainty of punishment (CoP) and the severity of punishment (SoP), on regular bidders’ to-collude decision-making. Data were collected from the Chinese construction industry to test the proposed SD model. While the model was supported, the results indicate that the CoP has a greater impact than the SoP on deterring regular bidders from making to-collude decisions. Furthermore, these two punitive measures cannot be replaced by each other, given the same deterrence effects. Thus, the study demonstrates the usefulness of deterrence theory to inhibit collusive bidding in the construction sector. It also sheds some light on the formulation of competition policy from the perspective of deterrence.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9913413 |
| spellingShingle | Wenhui Zhu Yuhang Zheng Kunhui Ye Qian Zhang Minjie Zhang Deterrence of Punitive Measures on Collusive Bidding in the Construction Sector Complexity |
| title | Deterrence of Punitive Measures on Collusive Bidding in the Construction Sector |
| title_full | Deterrence of Punitive Measures on Collusive Bidding in the Construction Sector |
| title_fullStr | Deterrence of Punitive Measures on Collusive Bidding in the Construction Sector |
| title_full_unstemmed | Deterrence of Punitive Measures on Collusive Bidding in the Construction Sector |
| title_short | Deterrence of Punitive Measures on Collusive Bidding in the Construction Sector |
| title_sort | deterrence of punitive measures on collusive bidding in the construction sector |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9913413 |
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