An Evolutionary Game Model of Knowledge Workers’ Counterproductive Work Behaviors Based on Preferences
Knowledge workers’ counterproductive work behaviors (CWB) always cause great loss to enterprises, but it is hard to supervise these behaviors. Based on the analysis of the causes of these behaviors, this paper builds a theoretical model of knowledge workers’ CWB and proposes that knowledge workers’...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2017-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/3295436 |
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| Summary: | Knowledge workers’ counterproductive work behaviors (CWB) always cause great loss to enterprises, but it is hard to supervise these behaviors. Based on the analysis of the causes of these behaviors, this paper builds a theoretical model of knowledge workers’ CWB and proposes that knowledge workers’ CWB are influenced by both rational and irrational factors. Regarding contextual factors and individual factors as risk preferences of knowledge workers, this paper establishes an asymmetrical evolutionary game model of enterprise supervision. Then, multiagent modeling simulation is conducted to discuss the effect of both formal and informal constraints on knowledge workers’ CWB and, based on it, the intervention strategies of enterprises are proposed. The simulation results show that the effect of informal constraints is bigger than the effect of formal constraints. The working environment and knowledge workers’ personality traits are the key factors to produce CWB. |
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| ISSN: | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |