The Divine Game Versus the Demonic Game

In Difference and Repetition1 Deleuze sets out to critique the regime of representation and common sense by developing a new conception of difference and repetition in which difference and repetition become liberated from the coherence and continuity of a self or I.2 Difference in itself mean...

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Main Author: Brecht Govaerts
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University Library System, University of Pittsburgh 2024-11-01
Series:Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy
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Online Access:http://www.jffp.org/ojs/jffp/article/view/1073
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author Brecht Govaerts
author_facet Brecht Govaerts
author_sort Brecht Govaerts
collection DOAJ
description In Difference and Repetition1 Deleuze sets out to critique the regime of representation and common sense by developing a new conception of difference and repetition in which difference and repetition become liberated from the coherence and continuity of a self or I.2 Difference in itself means that difference has become independent not only from representation, but also from an enduring or coherent self. Difference in itself and repetition in itself are the becoming different and the repetition of a fractured or dissolved self, which Deleuze relates to both a larval subject3 and to a simulacrum.4 In Difference and Repetition Deleuze defines both the concepts of larval subject and simulacrum through the multiplicities and differential relations of the realm of the virtual.5 However, they are not the same. A simulacrum defines a condition in which an entity has become transformed into pure appearance in which nothing appears. A simulacrum is no longer an entity, but only the illusion of an entity.6 This is distinct from the larval subject because the larval subject is an embryonic entity, an entity in the process of formation.7 Through an analysis of the conceptual relation and distinction between larval subject and simulacrum in the first part of the essay, I will reinterpret Deleuze as a philosopher of indifference and the impossibility of repetition, which is a critique on the common idea that Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition is a philosophy of pure difference and pure repetition. Also, I will argue that Deleuze did not just develop a transcendental empiricism (a metaphysics of process), but a philosophy of the universal in itself (which is the collapse of metaphysics). The universal in itself emerges when experience collapses and when the self-determination of entities has become impossible.
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spelling doaj-art-7da0c080027b4b8e81457cfee3eb815d2025-08-20T02:26:37ZengUniversity Library System, University of PittsburghJournal of French and Francophone Philosophy2155-11622024-11-01321/210.5195/jffp.2024.1073The Divine Game Versus the Demonic GameBrecht Govaerts0Independent Researcher In Difference and Repetition1 Deleuze sets out to critique the regime of representation and common sense by developing a new conception of difference and repetition in which difference and repetition become liberated from the coherence and continuity of a self or I.2 Difference in itself means that difference has become independent not only from representation, but also from an enduring or coherent self. Difference in itself and repetition in itself are the becoming different and the repetition of a fractured or dissolved self, which Deleuze relates to both a larval subject3 and to a simulacrum.4 In Difference and Repetition Deleuze defines both the concepts of larval subject and simulacrum through the multiplicities and differential relations of the realm of the virtual.5 However, they are not the same. A simulacrum defines a condition in which an entity has become transformed into pure appearance in which nothing appears. A simulacrum is no longer an entity, but only the illusion of an entity.6 This is distinct from the larval subject because the larval subject is an embryonic entity, an entity in the process of formation.7 Through an analysis of the conceptual relation and distinction between larval subject and simulacrum in the first part of the essay, I will reinterpret Deleuze as a philosopher of indifference and the impossibility of repetition, which is a critique on the common idea that Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition is a philosophy of pure difference and pure repetition. Also, I will argue that Deleuze did not just develop a transcendental empiricism (a metaphysics of process), but a philosophy of the universal in itself (which is the collapse of metaphysics). The universal in itself emerges when experience collapses and when the self-determination of entities has become impossible. http://www.jffp.org/ojs/jffp/article/view/1073DeleuzeKierkegaardKant
spellingShingle Brecht Govaerts
The Divine Game Versus the Demonic Game
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy
Deleuze
Kierkegaard
Kant
title The Divine Game Versus the Demonic Game
title_full The Divine Game Versus the Demonic Game
title_fullStr The Divine Game Versus the Demonic Game
title_full_unstemmed The Divine Game Versus the Demonic Game
title_short The Divine Game Versus the Demonic Game
title_sort divine game versus the demonic game
topic Deleuze
Kierkegaard
Kant
url http://www.jffp.org/ojs/jffp/article/view/1073
work_keys_str_mv AT brechtgovaerts thedivinegameversusthedemonicgame
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