A Simple Solution to the Scope Problem

According to the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare, something is good for me to the extent that I desire it. This theory faces the “scope problem”: many of the things I desire, intuitively, lie beyond the scope of my welfare. Here, I argue that a simple solution to this problem is available. Fir...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jacob Barrett
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Michigan Publishing 2025-04-01
Series:Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
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Online Access:https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/7429/
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Summary:According to the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare, something is good for me to the extent that I desire it. This theory faces the “scope problem”: many of the things I desire, intuitively, lie beyond the scope of my welfare. Here, I argue that a simple solution to this problem is available. First, I suggest that it is a general feature of desires that they can differ not only in their objects but also in their “targets,” or for the sake of whom one has the desire. For example, I can desire that my child win an award either for their sake or for my own sake. Second, I show that we can use this idea to solve the scope problem by holding that something is good for me to the extent that I desire it for my own sake. Despite first appearances, this solution is not ad hoc, incomplete, or circular.
ISSN:2330-4014