Natorp, Husserl and Pure Logic

The systematic confrontation between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology was strongly influenced by the dialogue between Natorp and Husserl, which largely dealt with the question of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, between the “bottom up” description promoted by the phenomenologic...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Massimo Ferrari
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University) 2025-12-01
Series:RUDN Journal of Philosophy
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Online Access:https://journals.rudn.ru/philosophy/article/viewFile/43535/24585
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Summary:The systematic confrontation between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology was strongly influenced by the dialogue between Natorp and Husserl, which largely dealt with the question of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, between the “bottom up” description promoted by the phenomenological method and the “top down” construction that characterizes instead the transcendental method. At the root of this passionate philosophical dispute, however, there is also another issue that is not always adequately considered: the nature of pure logic in the context of the rejection of psychologism. My paper focuses on this aspect and, in particular, examines Natorp’s anti-psychologistic conception of knowledge and his extensive discussion of Husserl’s Prolegomena to Pure Logic .
ISSN:2313-2302
2408-8900