Differential fault attack on FeW

In order to evaluate the security of the lightweight block cipher FeW,a differential fault attack method was proposed and discussed using a single byte random fault model.In this method,a single byte random fault was introduced on the right side of the last round of FeW to recover the key based on t...

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Main Authors: Min XIE, Jiaqi LI, Feng TIAN
Format: Article
Language:zho
Published: Editorial Department of Journal on Communications 2020-04-01
Series:Tongxin xuebao
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.joconline.com.cn/zh/article/doi/10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2020077/
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author Min XIE
Jiaqi LI
Feng TIAN
author_facet Min XIE
Jiaqi LI
Feng TIAN
author_sort Min XIE
collection DOAJ
description In order to evaluate the security of the lightweight block cipher FeW,a differential fault attack method was proposed and discussed using a single byte random fault model.In this method,a single byte random fault was introduced on the right side of the last round of FeW to recover the key based on the statistical characteristics of S-box difference distribution,and the difference information was obtained using the characteristics of the linear diffusion function.The experiment results show that the complete key recovery can be achieved with an average of 47.73 and 79.55 fault injections for FeW-64-80 and FeW-64-128 respectively.If 2<sup>10</sup>exhaustive calculations are added to the key recovery process,the number of average fault injections required can be reduced to 24.90 and 41.50.This attack is effective on FeW.
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institution Kabale University
issn 1000-436X
language zho
publishDate 2020-04-01
publisher Editorial Department of Journal on Communications
record_format Article
series Tongxin xuebao
spelling doaj-art-790190c14cad438587adf36f7e46c2772025-01-14T07:18:58ZzhoEditorial Department of Journal on CommunicationsTongxin xuebao1000-436X2020-04-014114314959734468Differential fault attack on FeWMin XIEJiaqi LIFeng TIANIn order to evaluate the security of the lightweight block cipher FeW,a differential fault attack method was proposed and discussed using a single byte random fault model.In this method,a single byte random fault was introduced on the right side of the last round of FeW to recover the key based on the statistical characteristics of S-box difference distribution,and the difference information was obtained using the characteristics of the linear diffusion function.The experiment results show that the complete key recovery can be achieved with an average of 47.73 and 79.55 fault injections for FeW-64-80 and FeW-64-128 respectively.If 2<sup>10</sup>exhaustive calculations are added to the key recovery process,the number of average fault injections required can be reduced to 24.90 and 41.50.This attack is effective on FeW.http://www.joconline.com.cn/zh/article/doi/10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2020077/FeW algorithmlightweight block cipherdifferential fault attacksingle byte fault model
spellingShingle Min XIE
Jiaqi LI
Feng TIAN
Differential fault attack on FeW
Tongxin xuebao
FeW algorithm
lightweight block cipher
differential fault attack
single byte fault model
title Differential fault attack on FeW
title_full Differential fault attack on FeW
title_fullStr Differential fault attack on FeW
title_full_unstemmed Differential fault attack on FeW
title_short Differential fault attack on FeW
title_sort differential fault attack on few
topic FeW algorithm
lightweight block cipher
differential fault attack
single byte fault model
url http://www.joconline.com.cn/zh/article/doi/10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2020077/
work_keys_str_mv AT minxie differentialfaultattackonfew
AT jiaqili differentialfaultattackonfew
AT fengtian differentialfaultattackonfew