Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain
As carbon emissions are increasing due to the development of economy, low-carbon supply chain plays an important role in carbon emissions reduction and the dual-channel supply chain has become a hit because online shopping is developing rapidly. Therefore, this paper builds a Stackelberg game model...
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9967381 |
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| _version_ | 1832560118682615808 |
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| author | Bingquan Liu Xuran Chang Boyang Nie Yue Wang Lingqi Meng |
| author_facet | Bingquan Liu Xuran Chang Boyang Nie Yue Wang Lingqi Meng |
| author_sort | Bingquan Liu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | As carbon emissions are increasing due to the development of economy, low-carbon supply chain plays an important role in carbon emissions reduction and the dual-channel supply chain has become a hit because online shopping is developing rapidly. Therefore, this paper builds a Stackelberg game model led by the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain to examine the reaction of the government under centralized or decentralized decisions-making structures with different low-carbon strategies. The result shows that the government can achieve higher profits by taking incentive or punitive measures for centralized decision-making supply chain no matter they invest in emissions reduction or not. Moreover, for decentralized decision-making mode, increasing low-carbon subsidies for retailers can achieve a win-win result between the supply chain and the government; and, finally, channel competition is good for improving the supply chain and social benefits. Therefore, the government is responsible for taking reasonable subsidy policies, formulate industry’s low-carbon standards, and properly guide competition between supply chain members to achieve higher profits. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-77e8f4d9722a477fa318242585879a83 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-77e8f4d9722a477fa318242585879a832025-02-03T01:28:23ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262021-01-01202110.1155/2021/99673819967381Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply ChainBingquan Liu0Xuran Chang1Boyang Nie2Yue Wang3Lingqi Meng4School of Economics & Management, China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao 266580, Shandong, ChinaSchool of Economics & Management, China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao 266580, Shandong, ChinaSchool of Economics & Management, China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao 266580, Shandong, ChinaSchool of Economics & Management, China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao 266580, Shandong, ChinaSchool of Economics & Management, China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao 266580, Shandong, ChinaAs carbon emissions are increasing due to the development of economy, low-carbon supply chain plays an important role in carbon emissions reduction and the dual-channel supply chain has become a hit because online shopping is developing rapidly. Therefore, this paper builds a Stackelberg game model led by the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain to examine the reaction of the government under centralized or decentralized decisions-making structures with different low-carbon strategies. The result shows that the government can achieve higher profits by taking incentive or punitive measures for centralized decision-making supply chain no matter they invest in emissions reduction or not. Moreover, for decentralized decision-making mode, increasing low-carbon subsidies for retailers can achieve a win-win result between the supply chain and the government; and, finally, channel competition is good for improving the supply chain and social benefits. Therefore, the government is responsible for taking reasonable subsidy policies, formulate industry’s low-carbon standards, and properly guide competition between supply chain members to achieve higher profits.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9967381 |
| spellingShingle | Bingquan Liu Xuran Chang Boyang Nie Yue Wang Lingqi Meng Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Complexity |
| title | Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain |
| title_full | Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain |
| title_fullStr | Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain |
| title_full_unstemmed | Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain |
| title_short | Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain |
| title_sort | government low carbon regulations based on supply chain members behavior and consumers channel preference in a dual channel supply chain |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9967381 |
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