Control-flow integrity technology based on the combination of software and hardware

For shadow stack, balancing security and performance was difficult, and the forward CFI (control-flow integrity) scheme implemented by software was too expensive and difficult to be deployed in practice. A hybrid CFI scheme based on software and hardware integration, named SHCFI (control-flow integr...

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Main Authors: LIANG Hao, HE Benwei, WANG Qingfeng, CHENG Guozhen, MA Hailong
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: POSTS&TELECOM PRESS Co., LTD 2024-10-01
Series:网络与信息安全学报
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.cjnis.com.cn/thesisDetails#10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2024070
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author LIANG Hao
HE Benwei
WANG Qingfeng
CHENG Guozhen
MA Hailong
author_facet LIANG Hao
HE Benwei
WANG Qingfeng
CHENG Guozhen
MA Hailong
author_sort LIANG Hao
collection DOAJ
description For shadow stack, balancing security and performance was difficult, and the forward CFI (control-flow integrity) scheme implemented by software was too expensive and difficult to be deployed in practice. A hybrid CFI scheme based on software and hardware integration, named SHCFI (control-flow integrity based on the combination of software and hardware), was proposed. Decompilation was undergone by the program using a binary rewriter to generate an intermediate representation, and various transfer instruction types were identified. For the protection of backward control flow, a novel parallel shadow stack scheme was introduced, featuring encrypted return addresses. This involved XOR encryption of return addresses on the stack using random numbers, with the encrypted results stored securely in a shadow stack located at a fixed offset on the original stack. During function returns, addresses in the shadow stack underwent XOR decryption, and the decrypted results served as the actual return addresses. For forward control flow protection, the hardware ENDBRANCH state machine instruction was utilized to mark the target addresses of indirect transfer instructions. At runtime, legitimacy checks were applied to these target addresses, thereby reducing performance overhead. Experimental results demonstrated that programs fortified with SHCFI effectively defended against code reuse attacks, exhibiting favorable runtime overhead.
format Article
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institution Kabale University
issn 2096-109X
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publisher POSTS&TELECOM PRESS Co., LTD
record_format Article
series 网络与信息安全学报
spelling doaj-art-757057ae40bf4a438c710ac855a7db722025-01-15T03:17:20ZengPOSTS&TELECOM PRESS Co., LTD网络与信息安全学报2096-109X2024-10-011010711877772248Control-flow integrity technology based on the combination of software and hardwareLIANG HaoHE BenweiWANG QingfengCHENG GuozhenMA HailongFor shadow stack, balancing security and performance was difficult, and the forward CFI (control-flow integrity) scheme implemented by software was too expensive and difficult to be deployed in practice. A hybrid CFI scheme based on software and hardware integration, named SHCFI (control-flow integrity based on the combination of software and hardware), was proposed. Decompilation was undergone by the program using a binary rewriter to generate an intermediate representation, and various transfer instruction types were identified. For the protection of backward control flow, a novel parallel shadow stack scheme was introduced, featuring encrypted return addresses. This involved XOR encryption of return addresses on the stack using random numbers, with the encrypted results stored securely in a shadow stack located at a fixed offset on the original stack. During function returns, addresses in the shadow stack underwent XOR decryption, and the decrypted results served as the actual return addresses. For forward control flow protection, the hardware ENDBRANCH state machine instruction was utilized to mark the target addresses of indirect transfer instructions. At runtime, legitimacy checks were applied to these target addresses, thereby reducing performance overhead. Experimental results demonstrated that programs fortified with SHCFI effectively defended against code reuse attacks, exhibiting favorable runtime overhead.http://www.cjnis.com.cn/thesisDetails#10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2024070software diversitycontrol-flow integritycombination of software and hardwarecode-reuse attack
spellingShingle LIANG Hao
HE Benwei
WANG Qingfeng
CHENG Guozhen
MA Hailong
Control-flow integrity technology based on the combination of software and hardware
网络与信息安全学报
software diversity
control-flow integrity
combination of software and hardware
code-reuse attack
title Control-flow integrity technology based on the combination of software and hardware
title_full Control-flow integrity technology based on the combination of software and hardware
title_fullStr Control-flow integrity technology based on the combination of software and hardware
title_full_unstemmed Control-flow integrity technology based on the combination of software and hardware
title_short Control-flow integrity technology based on the combination of software and hardware
title_sort control flow integrity technology based on the combination of software and hardware
topic software diversity
control-flow integrity
combination of software and hardware
code-reuse attack
url http://www.cjnis.com.cn/thesisDetails#10.11959/j.issn.2096-109x.2024070
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AT wangqingfeng controlflowintegritytechnologybasedonthecombinationofsoftwareandhardware
AT chengguozhen controlflowintegritytechnologybasedonthecombinationofsoftwareandhardware
AT mahailong controlflowintegritytechnologybasedonthecombinationofsoftwareandhardware