A Matching Model for Ride-Sharing: A Non-Cooperative Game Approach Between Drivers and Riders
This study proposes an optimal matching problem between drivers and riders as a generalised Nash equilibrium problem, which finds a solution where no drivers and riders have the incentive to change their strategy. The proposed model is formulated as a (D + R) person pure strategy game, where D and R...
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| Main Author: | Hiroshi Shimamoto |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2025-03-01
|
| Series: | Smart Cities |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2624-6511/8/2/40 |
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