A Matching Model for Ride-Sharing: A Non-Cooperative Game Approach Between Drivers and Riders
This study proposes an optimal matching problem between drivers and riders as a generalised Nash equilibrium problem, which finds a solution where no drivers and riders have the incentive to change their strategy. The proposed model is formulated as a (D + R) person pure strategy game, where D and R...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2025-03-01
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| Series: | Smart Cities |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2624-6511/8/2/40 |
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| Summary: | This study proposes an optimal matching problem between drivers and riders as a generalised Nash equilibrium problem, which finds a solution where no drivers and riders have the incentive to change their strategy. The proposed model is formulated as a (D + R) person pure strategy game, where D and R are the number of drivers and riders, respectively. We further reformulate the proposed model as a two-person pure strategy game. A solution algorithm that iteratively solves the drivers’ and riders’ sub-problem is proposed, which is proven to converge to a Nash equilibrium solution within a finite number of iterations. Finally, we numerically confirm that the proposed model yields a Nash equilibrium solution and then perform sensitivity analysis over the parameters of the proposed model. |
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| ISSN: | 2624-6511 |