The Reasons of the Confrontation Between Russia and the Ukraine
The article examines the historical prerequisites for the formation of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, analyzes its main provisions, and its impact on the foreign and domestic policy of the independent Ukrainian state. The Ukrainian national idea was formed in the late 19th first half of the...
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| Language: | Russian |
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Centre of Regional Research
2021-06-01
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| Series: | Проблемы постсоветского пространства |
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| Online Access: | https://www.postsovietarea.com/jour/article/view/281 |
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| author | В. A. Shmelev |
| author_facet | В. A. Shmelev |
| author_sort | В. A. Shmelev |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The article examines the historical prerequisites for the formation of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, analyzes its main provisions, and its impact on the foreign and domestic policy of the independent Ukrainian state. The Ukrainian national idea was formed in the late 19th first half of the 20th century. It was based on three fundamental provisions: the Russian state is the enemy of Ukrainian independence and therefore in the interests of Ukraine its weakening, and even better disintegration; the Russian population in Ukraine is a very serious obstacle to the formation of an independent Ukrainian state, and therefore it should be assimilated; the independence of the Ukrainian state can be guaranteed only by close cooperation with European countries, which will help it in defending its independence in the confrontation with “Asian” Russia, as Ukraine is a European country, part of Europe. On the basis of these ideological provisions it was supposed to form a Ukrainian identity. As the article emphasizes, the national Ukrainian idea in this form contains a very large charge of conflict with Russia, inevitably leads to a clash of their geopolitical interests. The proclamation of Ukraine’s independence in 1991 meant the emergence of a second Russian state, whose population had to be transformed into a Ukrainian nation. The ruling political elite of the country with the support of the Ukrainian intelligentsia as the ideological basis for the construction of the Ukrainian nation state and the Ukrainian nation adopted the basic tenets of the Ukrainian national idea, which was formed in the first half of the 20th century and put them at the basis of its foreign and domestic policy. All Ukrainian Presidents, though with varying degrees of determination and consistency, implemented them. Kiev’s policy of strengthening the country’s independence implied independence from Russia, which is seen as the main threat to the national security of the young Ukrainian state. The article states that the presidential elections of 2019 and the defeat of P. Poroshenko showed that the majority of Ukrainian society does not accept such an identity. They need an identity on other principles, which in Ukraine have not yet developed and are not visible. So far, there are no political forces, political party, that could formulate them and put them in the basis of statehood and nation-building. The current President V. Zelensky in his policy is guided by old ideas and visions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the New Independent States, Russia did not immediately realize the scale of the challenges and threats to the country’s security from Ukraine. Sobering occurred under the influence of the “Orange Revolution”, when Kiev abandoned the policy of multivectors and began to pursue a pronounced pro-Western policy. At the same time, Moscow begins to realize that it will not be able to enter the community of democratic states on its own terms, and begins to position itself as an independent center of power, opposing the West. Strengthening its positions in this confrontation, it connects with the consolidation of the post-Soviet states around itself within the framework of integration projects, first EvrAzES, and then the EAEU. Moscow linked their successful implementation with Ukraine’s participation in their implementation, because it believed that without it these projects would not be effective. However, Kiev did not want to support these plans, focusing “on entering Europe”. According to the author, from that moment the foreign policy strategies of both countries began to differ in principle and the two countries from strategic partners turned into geopolitical rivals. The West supported Kiev in its pro-Western foreign policy, considering it as an element of deterrence of Russia’s great-power ambitions. Both Moscow and the West tried to drag Kiev to their side. The coup d’etat carried out by nationalist forces in Kiev in February 2014 seemed to mean the West’s victory in this peculiar tug-of-war. In response, Moscow annexed Crimea and supported the struggle of the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR against the Kiev government. As a result, Ukraine has embarked on a tough confrontation with Russia, seeing it as an aggressor and an enemy. The author of the article comes to the conclusion, that overcoming the confrontation between them will take a lot of time and effort and for the foreseeable historical perspective the relations between them will be based on the principles of the zero-sum game. In these circumstances, there is no need to talk about partnership and cooperation, as it is a question of relations between two hostile States. The most that can be expected is to maintain a “cold peace” between them. But such a state can be achieved only if relations between Russia and the West are normalized, and a new Cold War is eliminated. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-71ace25e2b044c22b6606f7ff21cf242 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2313-8920 2587-8174 |
| language | Russian |
| publishDate | 2021-06-01 |
| publisher | Centre of Regional Research |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Проблемы постсоветского пространства |
| spelling | doaj-art-71ace25e2b044c22b6606f7ff21cf2422025-08-20T02:55:53ZrusCentre of Regional ResearchПроблемы постсоветского пространства2313-89202587-81742021-06-0181335310.24975/2313-8920-2021-8-1-33-53259The Reasons of the Confrontation Between Russia and the UkraineВ. A. Shmelev0Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of SciencesThe article examines the historical prerequisites for the formation of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, analyzes its main provisions, and its impact on the foreign and domestic policy of the independent Ukrainian state. The Ukrainian national idea was formed in the late 19th first half of the 20th century. It was based on three fundamental provisions: the Russian state is the enemy of Ukrainian independence and therefore in the interests of Ukraine its weakening, and even better disintegration; the Russian population in Ukraine is a very serious obstacle to the formation of an independent Ukrainian state, and therefore it should be assimilated; the independence of the Ukrainian state can be guaranteed only by close cooperation with European countries, which will help it in defending its independence in the confrontation with “Asian” Russia, as Ukraine is a European country, part of Europe. On the basis of these ideological provisions it was supposed to form a Ukrainian identity. As the article emphasizes, the national Ukrainian idea in this form contains a very large charge of conflict with Russia, inevitably leads to a clash of their geopolitical interests. The proclamation of Ukraine’s independence in 1991 meant the emergence of a second Russian state, whose population had to be transformed into a Ukrainian nation. The ruling political elite of the country with the support of the Ukrainian intelligentsia as the ideological basis for the construction of the Ukrainian nation state and the Ukrainian nation adopted the basic tenets of the Ukrainian national idea, which was formed in the first half of the 20th century and put them at the basis of its foreign and domestic policy. All Ukrainian Presidents, though with varying degrees of determination and consistency, implemented them. Kiev’s policy of strengthening the country’s independence implied independence from Russia, which is seen as the main threat to the national security of the young Ukrainian state. The article states that the presidential elections of 2019 and the defeat of P. Poroshenko showed that the majority of Ukrainian society does not accept such an identity. They need an identity on other principles, which in Ukraine have not yet developed and are not visible. So far, there are no political forces, political party, that could formulate them and put them in the basis of statehood and nation-building. The current President V. Zelensky in his policy is guided by old ideas and visions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the New Independent States, Russia did not immediately realize the scale of the challenges and threats to the country’s security from Ukraine. Sobering occurred under the influence of the “Orange Revolution”, when Kiev abandoned the policy of multivectors and began to pursue a pronounced pro-Western policy. At the same time, Moscow begins to realize that it will not be able to enter the community of democratic states on its own terms, and begins to position itself as an independent center of power, opposing the West. Strengthening its positions in this confrontation, it connects with the consolidation of the post-Soviet states around itself within the framework of integration projects, first EvrAzES, and then the EAEU. Moscow linked their successful implementation with Ukraine’s participation in their implementation, because it believed that without it these projects would not be effective. However, Kiev did not want to support these plans, focusing “on entering Europe”. According to the author, from that moment the foreign policy strategies of both countries began to differ in principle and the two countries from strategic partners turned into geopolitical rivals. The West supported Kiev in its pro-Western foreign policy, considering it as an element of deterrence of Russia’s great-power ambitions. Both Moscow and the West tried to drag Kiev to their side. The coup d’etat carried out by nationalist forces in Kiev in February 2014 seemed to mean the West’s victory in this peculiar tug-of-war. In response, Moscow annexed Crimea and supported the struggle of the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR against the Kiev government. As a result, Ukraine has embarked on a tough confrontation with Russia, seeing it as an aggressor and an enemy. The author of the article comes to the conclusion, that overcoming the confrontation between them will take a lot of time and effort and for the foreseeable historical perspective the relations between them will be based on the principles of the zero-sum game. In these circumstances, there is no need to talk about partnership and cooperation, as it is a question of relations between two hostile States. The most that can be expected is to maintain a “cold peace” between them. But such a state can be achieved only if relations between Russia and the West are normalized, and a new Cold War is eliminated.https://www.postsovietarea.com/jour/article/view/281nationalismnational ideanational identitygeopoliticsconfrontationstatehooddeterrencecivilization |
| spellingShingle | В. A. Shmelev The Reasons of the Confrontation Between Russia and the Ukraine Проблемы постсоветского пространства nationalism national idea national identity geopolitics confrontation statehood deterrence civilization |
| title | The Reasons of the Confrontation Between Russia and the Ukraine |
| title_full | The Reasons of the Confrontation Between Russia and the Ukraine |
| title_fullStr | The Reasons of the Confrontation Between Russia and the Ukraine |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Reasons of the Confrontation Between Russia and the Ukraine |
| title_short | The Reasons of the Confrontation Between Russia and the Ukraine |
| title_sort | reasons of the confrontation between russia and the ukraine |
| topic | nationalism national idea national identity geopolitics confrontation statehood deterrence civilization |
| url | https://www.postsovietarea.com/jour/article/view/281 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT vashmelev thereasonsoftheconfrontationbetweenrussiaandtheukraine AT vashmelev reasonsoftheconfrontationbetweenrussiaandtheukraine |