Research on Decision of Echelon Utilization of Retired Power Batteries Under Government Regulation
With the rapid development of new energy vehicles, the echelon utilization of power batteries has become a key pathway to promoting efficient resource recycling and environmental sustainability. To address the limitation of the existing studies that overlook the dynamic strategic interactions among...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2025-07-01
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| Series: | World Electric Vehicle Journal |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2032-6653/16/7/390 |
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| author | Xudong Deng Xiaoyu Zhang Yong Wang Lihui Wang |
| author_facet | Xudong Deng Xiaoyu Zhang Yong Wang Lihui Wang |
| author_sort | Xudong Deng |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | With the rapid development of new energy vehicles, the echelon utilization of power batteries has become a key pathway to promoting efficient resource recycling and environmental sustainability. To address the limitation of the existing studies that overlook the dynamic strategic interactions among multiple stakeholders, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, battery recycling enterprises, and consumers. By incorporating consumers’ battery usage levels into the strategy space, the model captures the behavioral evolution of all these parties under bounded rationality. Numerical simulations are conducted to analyze the impact of government incentives and penalties, consumer usage behaviors, and enterprise recycling modes on system stability. The results show that a “low-subsidy, high-penalty” mechanism can more effectively guide enterprises to prioritize echelon utilization and that moderate consumer usage significantly improves battery reuse efficiency. This study enriches the application of the evolutionary game theory in the field of battery recycling and provides quantitative evidence and practical insights for policy formulation. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-6a6e58ce2df54d7fa490e2b90b8194d1 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2032-6653 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-07-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | World Electric Vehicle Journal |
| spelling | doaj-art-6a6e58ce2df54d7fa490e2b90b8194d12025-08-20T03:13:58ZengMDPI AGWorld Electric Vehicle Journal2032-66532025-07-0116739010.3390/wevj16070390Research on Decision of Echelon Utilization of Retired Power Batteries Under Government RegulationXudong Deng0Xiaoyu Zhang1Yong Wang2Lihui Wang3School of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430080, ChinaSchool of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430080, ChinaSchool of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430080, ChinaDepartment of Production Engineering, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 114 28 Stockholm, SwedenWith the rapid development of new energy vehicles, the echelon utilization of power batteries has become a key pathway to promoting efficient resource recycling and environmental sustainability. To address the limitation of the existing studies that overlook the dynamic strategic interactions among multiple stakeholders, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, battery recycling enterprises, and consumers. By incorporating consumers’ battery usage levels into the strategy space, the model captures the behavioral evolution of all these parties under bounded rationality. Numerical simulations are conducted to analyze the impact of government incentives and penalties, consumer usage behaviors, and enterprise recycling modes on system stability. The results show that a “low-subsidy, high-penalty” mechanism can more effectively guide enterprises to prioritize echelon utilization and that moderate consumer usage significantly improves battery reuse efficiency. This study enriches the application of the evolutionary game theory in the field of battery recycling and provides quantitative evidence and practical insights for policy formulation.https://www.mdpi.com/2032-6653/16/7/390power batteryechelon utilizationdecision researchevolutionary gamegovernment regulation |
| spellingShingle | Xudong Deng Xiaoyu Zhang Yong Wang Lihui Wang Research on Decision of Echelon Utilization of Retired Power Batteries Under Government Regulation World Electric Vehicle Journal power battery echelon utilization decision research evolutionary game government regulation |
| title | Research on Decision of Echelon Utilization of Retired Power Batteries Under Government Regulation |
| title_full | Research on Decision of Echelon Utilization of Retired Power Batteries Under Government Regulation |
| title_fullStr | Research on Decision of Echelon Utilization of Retired Power Batteries Under Government Regulation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Research on Decision of Echelon Utilization of Retired Power Batteries Under Government Regulation |
| title_short | Research on Decision of Echelon Utilization of Retired Power Batteries Under Government Regulation |
| title_sort | research on decision of echelon utilization of retired power batteries under government regulation |
| topic | power battery echelon utilization decision research evolutionary game government regulation |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2032-6653/16/7/390 |
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