Multiparty Evolutionary Game Model in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application
Coal mine safety management involves many interested parties and there are complex relationships between them. According to game theory, a multiparty evolutionary game model is established to analyze the selection of strategies. Then, a simplified three-party model is taken as an example to carry ou...
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Main Authors: | Rongwu Lu, Xinhua Wang, Hao Yu, Dan Li |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2018-01-01
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Series: | Complexity |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/9620142 |
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