Multiparty Evolutionary Game Model in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application
Coal mine safety management involves many interested parties and there are complex relationships between them. According to game theory, a multiparty evolutionary game model is established to analyze the selection of strategies. Then, a simplified three-party model is taken as an example to carry ou...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2018-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/9620142 |
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| Summary: | Coal mine safety management involves many interested parties and there are complex relationships between them. According to game theory, a multiparty evolutionary game model is established to analyze the selection of strategies. Then, a simplified three-party model is taken as an example to carry out detailed analysis and solution. Based on stability theory of dynamics system and phase diagram analysis, this article studies replicator dynamics of the evolutionary model to make an optimization analysis of the behaviors of those interested parties and the adjustment mechanism of safety management policies and decisions. The results show how the charge of supervision of government department and inspection of coal mine enterprise impact the efficiency of safety management and the effect of constraint measures and incentive and other measures in safety management. |
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| ISSN: | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |