Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism under Moral Hazard
Cooperative relay can effectively improve spectrum efficiency by exploiting the spatial diversity in the wireless networks. However, wireless nodes may acquire different network information with various users’ location and mobility, channels’ conditions, and other factors, which results in asymmetri...
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| Main Authors: | Nan Zhao, Minghu Wu, Wei Xiong, Cong Liu |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2015-01-01
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| Series: | Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/690807 |
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