A research on the regulatory human resource allocation efficiency under the random examination system
The traditional view is that the more regulatory staff is, the stronger regulatory enforcement is, and the better regulatory effect is. However, from the perspective of team coordination, the more regulatory staff is, the higher the regulatory team coordination cost is, and the worse regulatory effe...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Taylor & Francis Group
2025-02-01
|
| Series: | China Journal of Accounting Studies |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/21697213.2025.2469696 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | The traditional view is that the more regulatory staff is, the stronger regulatory enforcement is, and the better regulatory effect is. However, from the perspective of team coordination, the more regulatory staff is, the higher the regulatory team coordination cost is, and the worse regulatory effect is. Based on the CSRC’s random examination system, it is found that under this system, corporate financial misreporting decreases firstly and then increases with the increase of on-site examiners. Mechanism tests indicate that this result is more significant when the regulatory team coordination cost is higher, such as the time team members having worked together is shorter, team diversity is higher, or team members are busier. It is also found that auditors nonlinearly adjust their audit fees according to the change of regulatory pressure. The above results suggest that the regulatory team coordination cost does influence the regulatory human resource allocation efficiency. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2169-7213 2169-7221 |