Le « scientifiquement prouvé » et l’appel au complot : les deux facettes d’une même méprise épistémique
The aim of the present paper is to show that, when properly understood, both the ’scientifically proven’ and calls to conspiracy are grounded in the very same epistemic misunderstanding about the exact nature of what is commonly required to acquire knowledge. In other words, I will track and identif...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Éditions Kimé
2024-11-01
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| Series: | Philosophia Scientiæ |
| Online Access: | https://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/4503 |
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| Summary: | The aim of the present paper is to show that, when properly understood, both the ’scientifically proven’ and calls to conspiracy are grounded in the very same epistemic misunderstanding about the exact nature of what is commonly required to acquire knowledge. In other words, I will track and identify the common (illegitimate) basis for both these rhetorical manoeuvres which unfortunately occupy most of the space in public debates nowadays. On this basis, I will offer a modest philosophical recommendation for science communicators. With these objectives in mind, I will first present a historical case about the acquisition of new scientific knowledge (section 2). This may initially seem a secondary issue but it will help render a given epistemic process salient and this will then be accounted for by a recent epistemological theory (section 3). On this basis, both the ’scientifically proven’ and calls to conspiracies will be characterized, the aim being to show that these rhetorical strategies actually constitute the two sides of the same epistemic fallacy. |
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| ISSN: | 1281-2463 1775-4283 |