Moderate Epistemic Akrasia
Moderate epistemic akrasia is the state a subject is in when she believes that p and suspends judgment about whether her evidence supports p. In this article it is argued that, given a certain understanding of the attitude of suspension of judgment, moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically irratio...
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| Main Author: | Nicolás Lo Guercio |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)
2018-09-01
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| Series: | Crítica |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/pg/en/descarga_ing.php?id_volumen=183&id_articulo=1141 |
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