Moderate Epistemic Akrasia
Moderate epistemic akrasia is the state a subject is in when she believes that p and suspends judgment about whether her evidence supports p. In this article it is argued that, given a certain understanding of the attitude of suspension of judgment, moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically irratio...
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| Language: | English |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)
2018-09-01
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| Series: | Crítica |
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| Online Access: | http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/pg/en/descarga_ing.php?id_volumen=183&id_articulo=1141 |
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| author | Nicolás Lo Guercio |
| author_facet | Nicolás Lo Guercio |
| author_sort | Nicolás Lo Guercio |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Moderate epistemic akrasia is the state a subject is in when she believes that p and suspends judgment about whether her evidence supports p. In this article it is argued that, given a certain understanding of the attitude of suspension of judgment, moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically irrational. The paper starts with a brief introduction that makes explicit some background notions and clarifies the dialectics of the debate. Second, the well-known distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality is introduced and some cases of improper basing are discussed (Turri 2011). Third, two different cases are considered in which one might argue that moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically rational, and it is argued that none is successful. Fourth, several objections are presented and answered. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-6264514205a74df584b6731327d40aab |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 0011-1503 1870-4905 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2018-09-01 |
| publisher | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Crítica |
| spelling | doaj-art-6264514205a74df584b6731327d40aab2025-01-02T19:06:39ZengUniversidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)Crítica0011-15031870-49052018-09-01501486997Moderate Epistemic AkrasiaNicolás Lo GuercioModerate epistemic akrasia is the state a subject is in when she believes that p and suspends judgment about whether her evidence supports p. In this article it is argued that, given a certain understanding of the attitude of suspension of judgment, moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically irrational. The paper starts with a brief introduction that makes explicit some background notions and clarifies the dialectics of the debate. Second, the well-known distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality is introduced and some cases of improper basing are discussed (Turri 2011). Third, two different cases are considered in which one might argue that moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically rational, and it is argued that none is successful. Fourth, several objections are presented and answered. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/pg/en/descarga_ing.php?id_volumen=183&id_articulo=1141suspension of judgmenthigher-order evidencedoxastic rationalitypropositional rationalityepistemic basing relation |
| spellingShingle | Nicolás Lo Guercio Moderate Epistemic Akrasia Crítica suspension of judgment higher-order evidence doxastic rationality propositional rationality epistemic basing relation |
| title | Moderate Epistemic Akrasia |
| title_full | Moderate Epistemic Akrasia |
| title_fullStr | Moderate Epistemic Akrasia |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moderate Epistemic Akrasia |
| title_short | Moderate Epistemic Akrasia |
| title_sort | moderate epistemic akrasia |
| topic | suspension of judgment higher-order evidence doxastic rationality propositional rationality epistemic basing relation |
| url | http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/pg/en/descarga_ing.php?id_volumen=183&id_articulo=1141 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nicolasloguercio moderateepistemicakrasia |