Evolutionary Game of Port Behavior and Government Supervision under Carbon Quota Mechanisms
This paper explores the impact of exploring government regulation on the use of green technologies in ports under the carbon quota mechanism. It shows that: (1) static reward and punishment mechanism is easy to lead to system oscillation and difficult to stabilize; (2) dynamic reward and punishment...
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| Main Authors: | Zhou Xiaofei, Yang Man |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
EDP Sciences
2025-01-01
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| Series: | E3S Web of Conferences |
| Online Access: | https://www.e3s-conferences.org/articles/e3sconf/pdf/2025/25/e3sconf_iceree2025_03002.pdf |
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