A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price Benefits
This paper incorporates fairness concerns and consumer reference price effects into a two-echelon building-material closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. By establishing four differential game models, we investigate the sustainable operations and cooperation of this s...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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Series: | Complexity |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5555307 |
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author | Huimin Xiao Youlei Xu Shiwei Li |
author_facet | Huimin Xiao Youlei Xu Shiwei Li |
author_sort | Huimin Xiao |
collection | DOAJ |
description | This paper incorporates fairness concerns and consumer reference price effects into a two-echelon building-material closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. By establishing four differential game models, we investigate the sustainable operations and cooperation of this supply chain. The four game models are a Nash noncooperative game, Stackelberg game with cost sharing, Stackelberg game with fairness concerns and cost sharing, and centralized decision model. By using dynamic models and optimal control theory, we obtain the two members’ optimal equilibrium strategies in the supply chain. Analytical results show that the consumer reference price effect has a positive impact on the manufacturer’s effort level, retailer’s publicity level, and product brand goodwill, which can improve the supply chain performance. The retailer’s partial commitment to cost sharing can enhance the production enthusiasm of the manufacturer, improve the brand reputation of the product, and enhance the two members’ individual profitability. The distributional fairness concerns of the manufacturer not only prevent the manufacturer and retailer from achieving Pareto improvement but also lead to the decline of the manufacturer’s effort level and profitability. The research conclusions of this paper can provide some insights into the cooperation and sustainable development of the supply chain. |
format | Article |
id | doaj-art-5fc14a0cc22f473c975afe97324eb871 |
institution | Kabale University |
issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
publisher | Wiley |
record_format | Article |
series | Complexity |
spelling | doaj-art-5fc14a0cc22f473c975afe97324eb8712025-02-03T06:06:31ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262021-01-01202110.1155/2021/55553075555307A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price BenefitsHuimin Xiao0Youlei Xu1Shiwei Li2Computer and Information Engineering College, Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou, ChinaComputer and Information Engineering College, Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou, ChinaComputer and Information Engineering College, Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou, ChinaThis paper incorporates fairness concerns and consumer reference price effects into a two-echelon building-material closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. By establishing four differential game models, we investigate the sustainable operations and cooperation of this supply chain. The four game models are a Nash noncooperative game, Stackelberg game with cost sharing, Stackelberg game with fairness concerns and cost sharing, and centralized decision model. By using dynamic models and optimal control theory, we obtain the two members’ optimal equilibrium strategies in the supply chain. Analytical results show that the consumer reference price effect has a positive impact on the manufacturer’s effort level, retailer’s publicity level, and product brand goodwill, which can improve the supply chain performance. The retailer’s partial commitment to cost sharing can enhance the production enthusiasm of the manufacturer, improve the brand reputation of the product, and enhance the two members’ individual profitability. The distributional fairness concerns of the manufacturer not only prevent the manufacturer and retailer from achieving Pareto improvement but also lead to the decline of the manufacturer’s effort level and profitability. The research conclusions of this paper can provide some insights into the cooperation and sustainable development of the supply chain.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5555307 |
spellingShingle | Huimin Xiao Youlei Xu Shiwei Li A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price Benefits Complexity |
title | A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price Benefits |
title_full | A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price Benefits |
title_fullStr | A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price Benefits |
title_full_unstemmed | A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price Benefits |
title_short | A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price Benefits |
title_sort | building material supply chain sustainable operations under fairness concerns and reference price benefits |
url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5555307 |
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