Optimal time-based and cost-based contracts in construction projects under asymmetric information
A project owner (principal) delegates a project to a contractor (agent). Because the contractor has construction experience, he has private information about the project’s expected completion time. Besides, the contractor can exert an unobservable effort to shorten the completion time. Under an asy...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Vilnius Gediminas Technical University
2025-03-01
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| Series: | Journal of Civil Engineering and Management |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://jau.vgtu.lt/index.php/JCEM/article/view/23318 |
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