Could Executive Compensation Incentive Enhance the Efficiency of Enterprise Resource Allocation? An Empirical Study from China

Corporate executives have the decision-making power of resource allocation, and efficient resource allocation is an important measure of high-quality development of enterprises. It is a focal issue whether the compensation incentive can promote the executives to make better use of the enterprise res...

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Main Authors: Xianan Yin, Hua Ming, Jing Cui, Xinzhong Bao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2021-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7073878
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author Xianan Yin
Hua Ming
Jing Cui
Xinzhong Bao
author_facet Xianan Yin
Hua Ming
Jing Cui
Xinzhong Bao
author_sort Xianan Yin
collection DOAJ
description Corporate executives have the decision-making power of resource allocation, and efficient resource allocation is an important measure of high-quality development of enterprises. It is a focal issue whether the compensation incentive can promote the executives to make better use of the enterprise resource allocation. We investigate this question using the data of the Chinese listed companies in 2015–2019 based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and fixed effect model. The results show the following: (1) both monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive can significantly improve the efficiency of resource allocation, and the former is more significant; (2) there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between perquisite consumption incentive and resource allocation efficiency; (3) the above conclusion is still true in state-owned enterprises; (4) in private enterprises, the effect of equity incentive is more effective, but the effect of perquisite consumption incentive is less significant. The results highlight the relationship between compensation incentive and enterprise resource allocation. Our study is expected to guide the executives to formulate reasonable compensation incentives and improve the efficiency of resource allocation.
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institution Kabale University
issn 1026-0226
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publishDate 2021-01-01
publisher Wiley
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spelling doaj-art-5c99ee070ac44cb8ab0dcf9931230e702025-02-03T01:27:02ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2021-01-01202110.1155/2021/70738787073878Could Executive Compensation Incentive Enhance the Efficiency of Enterprise Resource Allocation? An Empirical Study from ChinaXianan Yin0Hua Ming1Jing Cui2Xinzhong Bao3School of Management, Beijing Union University, Beijing 100101, ChinaSchool of Management, Beijing Union University, Beijing 100101, ChinaSchool of Management, Beijing Union University, Beijing 100101, ChinaSchool of Management, Beijing Union University, Beijing 100101, ChinaCorporate executives have the decision-making power of resource allocation, and efficient resource allocation is an important measure of high-quality development of enterprises. It is a focal issue whether the compensation incentive can promote the executives to make better use of the enterprise resource allocation. We investigate this question using the data of the Chinese listed companies in 2015–2019 based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and fixed effect model. The results show the following: (1) both monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive can significantly improve the efficiency of resource allocation, and the former is more significant; (2) there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between perquisite consumption incentive and resource allocation efficiency; (3) the above conclusion is still true in state-owned enterprises; (4) in private enterprises, the effect of equity incentive is more effective, but the effect of perquisite consumption incentive is less significant. The results highlight the relationship between compensation incentive and enterprise resource allocation. Our study is expected to guide the executives to formulate reasonable compensation incentives and improve the efficiency of resource allocation.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7073878
spellingShingle Xianan Yin
Hua Ming
Jing Cui
Xinzhong Bao
Could Executive Compensation Incentive Enhance the Efficiency of Enterprise Resource Allocation? An Empirical Study from China
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
title Could Executive Compensation Incentive Enhance the Efficiency of Enterprise Resource Allocation? An Empirical Study from China
title_full Could Executive Compensation Incentive Enhance the Efficiency of Enterprise Resource Allocation? An Empirical Study from China
title_fullStr Could Executive Compensation Incentive Enhance the Efficiency of Enterprise Resource Allocation? An Empirical Study from China
title_full_unstemmed Could Executive Compensation Incentive Enhance the Efficiency of Enterprise Resource Allocation? An Empirical Study from China
title_short Could Executive Compensation Incentive Enhance the Efficiency of Enterprise Resource Allocation? An Empirical Study from China
title_sort could executive compensation incentive enhance the efficiency of enterprise resource allocation an empirical study from china
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7073878
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