Anti-corruption in Vietnam - an institutional analysis
Corruption is considered a threat to the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the regime’s existence Anti-corruption therefore has been seen as a fight for the regime’s existence in Vietnam. As a result, it has been given high priority in the political agenda of Vietnam. Usi...
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Taylor & Francis Group
2025-12-01
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| Series: | Cogent Social Sciences |
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| Online Access: | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/23311886.2025.2460320 |
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| author | Ngoc Anh Nguyen Duc Nhuan Nguyen |
| author_facet | Ngoc Anh Nguyen Duc Nhuan Nguyen |
| author_sort | Ngoc Anh Nguyen |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Corruption is considered a threat to the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the regime’s existence Anti-corruption therefore has been seen as a fight for the regime’s existence in Vietnam. As a result, it has been given high priority in the political agenda of Vietnam. Using the anti-corruption institutional framework developed by John Quah, the study tests the following hypotheses (i) the political will in Vietnam is high at present but remains questionable in the longer term; and (ii) the anti-corruption institutions are strong at the central level but remain relatively weak at the local level. Using the anti-corruption institutional framework developed by John Quah, the study tests the following hypotheses: (i) the political will in Vietnam is high at present but remains questionable in the longer term; and (ii) the anti-corruption institutions are strong at the central level but remain relatively weak at the local level.Key findings of this study support these hypotheses as follows:First, the anti-corruption political will is strong in Vietnam at present. The establishment of the CSCACW in 2013 made a significant improvement in anti-corruption in Vietnam. Even though there are many agencies involved, strong coordination of CSCACW helps address cross-agency cooperation and bureaucracy challenges. The CSCACW has been driving this process over the past 12 years thanks to strong support from the CPV’s top leaders, particularly the CPV’s General Secretary Mr. Nguyen Phu Trong.There is evidence of willingness to support and reinforce the anti-corruption institutions with great empowerment and support. However, this CSCACW model has some limitations. It depends largely on the support and dedication from the very top level, which is renewed every five years, with the next CPV’s Congress in 2026. In addition, it might create a false perception that anti-corruption is the Party’s internal affairs, which would discourage people and society’s participation in anti-corruption. Furthermore, it might even cause infighting between the Party and state agencies. Second, the anti-corruption institutions are strong at central level as proved with effective coordination and results delivered in the past 12 years since the CSCACW was restructured and led by CPV’s Secretary General. Yet, this remains relatively weak at local level even though PSCACWs follow similar organizational structure and operating model of CSCACW and have power to mobilize staff, vehicles and equipment of other agencies, offices, and organizations for carrying out their duties. While the recent establishment of PSCACWs in 63/63 provinces/cities is a radical development, the success at provincial level remains questionable. This is a new institutional setup at the local level, where the relationships are closer with many relatives and friends around, hence the favouritism and nepotism tend to flourish, and rules and regulations are easily bended for the comfort of powerful corrupt officials at provinces. It shows that the anti-corruption institutions are strong at central level but remain relatively weak at local level. Third, merging existing anti-corruption agencies into a single anti-corruption agency like the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore might be an option for Vietnam in the future. Such an agency (the Special Bureau Inspectorate) existed in Vietnam from 1945 to 1949. However, this might take time and require a radical institutional transformation process. Therefore, a strong coordination entity such as CSCACW with greater independence from the Party’s control and less dependence on police force is needed at present. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-5c5ea1c8273f4629a4def90184cb9ca6 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2331-1886 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-12-01 |
| publisher | Taylor & Francis Group |
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| series | Cogent Social Sciences |
| spelling | doaj-art-5c5ea1c8273f4629a4def90184cb9ca62025-08-20T02:38:06ZengTaylor & Francis GroupCogent Social Sciences2331-18862025-12-0111110.1080/23311886.2025.2460320Anti-corruption in Vietnam - an institutional analysisNgoc Anh Nguyen0Duc Nhuan Nguyen1Institute of Party Building Affairs, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics, Hanoi, VietnamInstitute of Party Building Affairs, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics, Hanoi, VietnamCorruption is considered a threat to the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the regime’s existence Anti-corruption therefore has been seen as a fight for the regime’s existence in Vietnam. As a result, it has been given high priority in the political agenda of Vietnam. Using the anti-corruption institutional framework developed by John Quah, the study tests the following hypotheses (i) the political will in Vietnam is high at present but remains questionable in the longer term; and (ii) the anti-corruption institutions are strong at the central level but remain relatively weak at the local level. Using the anti-corruption institutional framework developed by John Quah, the study tests the following hypotheses: (i) the political will in Vietnam is high at present but remains questionable in the longer term; and (ii) the anti-corruption institutions are strong at the central level but remain relatively weak at the local level.Key findings of this study support these hypotheses as follows:First, the anti-corruption political will is strong in Vietnam at present. The establishment of the CSCACW in 2013 made a significant improvement in anti-corruption in Vietnam. Even though there are many agencies involved, strong coordination of CSCACW helps address cross-agency cooperation and bureaucracy challenges. The CSCACW has been driving this process over the past 12 years thanks to strong support from the CPV’s top leaders, particularly the CPV’s General Secretary Mr. Nguyen Phu Trong.There is evidence of willingness to support and reinforce the anti-corruption institutions with great empowerment and support. However, this CSCACW model has some limitations. It depends largely on the support and dedication from the very top level, which is renewed every five years, with the next CPV’s Congress in 2026. In addition, it might create a false perception that anti-corruption is the Party’s internal affairs, which would discourage people and society’s participation in anti-corruption. Furthermore, it might even cause infighting between the Party and state agencies. Second, the anti-corruption institutions are strong at central level as proved with effective coordination and results delivered in the past 12 years since the CSCACW was restructured and led by CPV’s Secretary General. Yet, this remains relatively weak at local level even though PSCACWs follow similar organizational structure and operating model of CSCACW and have power to mobilize staff, vehicles and equipment of other agencies, offices, and organizations for carrying out their duties. While the recent establishment of PSCACWs in 63/63 provinces/cities is a radical development, the success at provincial level remains questionable. This is a new institutional setup at the local level, where the relationships are closer with many relatives and friends around, hence the favouritism and nepotism tend to flourish, and rules and regulations are easily bended for the comfort of powerful corrupt officials at provinces. It shows that the anti-corruption institutions are strong at central level but remain relatively weak at local level. Third, merging existing anti-corruption agencies into a single anti-corruption agency like the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore might be an option for Vietnam in the future. Such an agency (the Special Bureau Inspectorate) existed in Vietnam from 1945 to 1949. However, this might take time and require a radical institutional transformation process. Therefore, a strong coordination entity such as CSCACW with greater independence from the Party’s control and less dependence on police force is needed at present.https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/23311886.2025.2460320Anti-corruptioninstitutionregimeVietnamAsian PoliticsGovernment |
| spellingShingle | Ngoc Anh Nguyen Duc Nhuan Nguyen Anti-corruption in Vietnam - an institutional analysis Cogent Social Sciences Anti-corruption institution regime Vietnam Asian Politics Government |
| title | Anti-corruption in Vietnam - an institutional analysis |
| title_full | Anti-corruption in Vietnam - an institutional analysis |
| title_fullStr | Anti-corruption in Vietnam - an institutional analysis |
| title_full_unstemmed | Anti-corruption in Vietnam - an institutional analysis |
| title_short | Anti-corruption in Vietnam - an institutional analysis |
| title_sort | anti corruption in vietnam an institutional analysis |
| topic | Anti-corruption institution regime Vietnam Asian Politics Government |
| url | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/23311886.2025.2460320 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ngocanhnguyen anticorruptioninvietnamaninstitutionalanalysis AT ducnhuannguyen anticorruptioninvietnamaninstitutionalanalysis |