The Influence of Interlocking Directorates on the Propensity of Dividend Payout to the Parent Company

An examination was performed on whether director interlocks enabled the adoption of a dividend policy for the benefit of the parent company in the ownership structure. Specifically, the study investigated the dependence of the impact of the central position in the board network on the probability of...

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Main Author: Dariusz Siudak
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2020-01-01
Series:Complexity
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/6262519
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author Dariusz Siudak
author_facet Dariusz Siudak
author_sort Dariusz Siudak
collection DOAJ
description An examination was performed on whether director interlocks enabled the adoption of a dividend policy for the benefit of the parent company in the ownership structure. Specifically, the study investigated the dependence of the impact of the central position in the board network on the probability of dividend payment. Based on sample of firms listed on Polish capital market, it was observed that the more central the company’s position in the interlocking directorate network, the more likely it is to pay dividends to a subsidiary. This effect is related to the eigenvector centrality. The results obtained suggest that corporate financial policy can be spread across firms through the board network.
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spelling doaj-art-59d7293decf4434591e0d508dd0233dc2025-08-20T03:34:37ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262020-01-01202010.1155/2020/62625196262519The Influence of Interlocking Directorates on the Propensity of Dividend Payout to the Parent CompanyDariusz Siudak0Lodz University of Technology, Institute of Social Sciences and Management of Technologies, Lodz, PolandAn examination was performed on whether director interlocks enabled the adoption of a dividend policy for the benefit of the parent company in the ownership structure. Specifically, the study investigated the dependence of the impact of the central position in the board network on the probability of dividend payment. Based on sample of firms listed on Polish capital market, it was observed that the more central the company’s position in the interlocking directorate network, the more likely it is to pay dividends to a subsidiary. This effect is related to the eigenvector centrality. The results obtained suggest that corporate financial policy can be spread across firms through the board network.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/6262519
spellingShingle Dariusz Siudak
The Influence of Interlocking Directorates on the Propensity of Dividend Payout to the Parent Company
Complexity
title The Influence of Interlocking Directorates on the Propensity of Dividend Payout to the Parent Company
title_full The Influence of Interlocking Directorates on the Propensity of Dividend Payout to the Parent Company
title_fullStr The Influence of Interlocking Directorates on the Propensity of Dividend Payout to the Parent Company
title_full_unstemmed The Influence of Interlocking Directorates on the Propensity of Dividend Payout to the Parent Company
title_short The Influence of Interlocking Directorates on the Propensity of Dividend Payout to the Parent Company
title_sort influence of interlocking directorates on the propensity of dividend payout to the parent company
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/6262519
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