How to dissolve The moral problem
According to Michael Smith, there is so much metaethical disagreement because it is difficult to explain both the objectivity and the practicality of moral judgments in the framework provided by the Humean picture of human Psychology. Smith himself hoped to solve this problem by analysing the conten...
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| Language: | English |
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University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Philosophy
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Belgrade Philosophical Annual |
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| Online Access: | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912401121S.pdf |
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| _version_ | 1832096665489637376 |
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| author | Suikkanen Jussi |
| author_facet | Suikkanen Jussi |
| author_sort | Suikkanen Jussi |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | According to Michael Smith, there is so much metaethical disagreement because it is difficult to explain both the objectivity and the practicality of moral judgments in the framework provided by the Humean picture of human Psychology. Smith himself hoped to solve this problem by analysing the content of our moral judgments in terms of what our fully rational versions would want us to do. This paper first explains why this solution to the moral problem remains problematic and why we therefore are no closer to solving the problem. It then outlines how the moral problem could perhaps be dissolved instead. The second half of the paper thus first reconstructs the moral problem in the framework of dispositionalism about belief. It then suggests that, if we think of moral beliefs in dispositionalist terms and take 'believe' to be a vague predicate, we can come to see why many of the most fundamental metaethical questions cannot be answered. The last section of the paper then extends this method of dissolving metaethical questions to other popular views about belief. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-58294335fea3417e83941f10787ad26b |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 0353-3891 2956-0357 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-01-01 |
| publisher | University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Philosophy |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Belgrade Philosophical Annual |
| spelling | doaj-art-58294335fea3417e83941f10787ad26b2025-02-05T12:20:31ZengUniversity of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for PhilosophyBelgrade Philosophical Annual0353-38912956-03572024-01-0137112114110.5937/BPA2437121S0353-38912401121SHow to dissolve The moral problemSuikkanen Jussi0University of BirminghamAccording to Michael Smith, there is so much metaethical disagreement because it is difficult to explain both the objectivity and the practicality of moral judgments in the framework provided by the Humean picture of human Psychology. Smith himself hoped to solve this problem by analysing the content of our moral judgments in terms of what our fully rational versions would want us to do. This paper first explains why this solution to the moral problem remains problematic and why we therefore are no closer to solving the problem. It then outlines how the moral problem could perhaps be dissolved instead. The second half of the paper thus first reconstructs the moral problem in the framework of dispositionalism about belief. It then suggests that, if we think of moral beliefs in dispositionalist terms and take 'believe' to be a vague predicate, we can come to see why many of the most fundamental metaethical questions cannot be answered. The last section of the paper then extends this method of dissolving metaethical questions to other popular views about belief.https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912401121S.pdfbeliefdispositionalismmichael smithmoral problemmetaethics |
| spellingShingle | Suikkanen Jussi How to dissolve The moral problem Belgrade Philosophical Annual belief dispositionalism michael smith moral problem metaethics |
| title | How to dissolve The moral problem |
| title_full | How to dissolve The moral problem |
| title_fullStr | How to dissolve The moral problem |
| title_full_unstemmed | How to dissolve The moral problem |
| title_short | How to dissolve The moral problem |
| title_sort | how to dissolve the moral problem |
| topic | belief dispositionalism michael smith moral problem metaethics |
| url | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912401121S.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT suikkanenjussi howtodissolvethemoralproblem |