Repeated games with partner choice.
Repetition is a classic mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The standard way to study repeated games is to assume that there is an exogenous probability with which every interaction is repeated. If it is sufficiently likely that interactions are repeated, then reciprocity and cooperation can...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2025-02-01
|
| Series: | PLoS Computational Biology |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012810 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1850148858198228992 |
|---|---|
| author | Christopher Graser Takako Fujiwara-Greve Julián García Matthijs van Veelen |
| author_facet | Christopher Graser Takako Fujiwara-Greve Julián García Matthijs van Veelen |
| author_sort | Christopher Graser |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Repetition is a classic mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The standard way to study repeated games is to assume that there is an exogenous probability with which every interaction is repeated. If it is sufficiently likely that interactions are repeated, then reciprocity and cooperation can evolve together in repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Who individuals interact with can however also be under their control, or at least to some degree. If we change the standard model so that it allows for individuals to terminate the interaction with their current partner, and find someone else to play their prisoner's dilemmas with, then this limits the effectiveness of disciplining each other within the partnership, as one can always leave to escape punishment. The option to leave can however also be used to get away from someone who is not cooperating, which also has a disciplining effect. We find that the net effect of introducing the option to leave on cooperation is positive; with the option to leave, the average amount of cooperation that evolves in simulations is substantially higher than without. One of the reasons for this increase in cooperation is that partner choice creates endogenous phenotypic assortment. Compared to the standard models for the co-evolution of reciprocity and cooperation, and models of kin selection, our model thereby produces a better match with many forms of human cooperation in repeated settings. Individuals in our model end up interacting, not with random others that they cannot separate from, once matched, or with others that they are genetically related to, but with partners that they choose to stay with, and that are similarly dependable not to play defect as they are themselves. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-55fe41c65ac2437597be2f5f021aec0a |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 1553-734X 1553-7358 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-02-01 |
| publisher | Public Library of Science (PLoS) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | PLoS Computational Biology |
| spelling | doaj-art-55fe41c65ac2437597be2f5f021aec0a2025-08-20T02:27:06ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS Computational Biology1553-734X1553-73582025-02-01212e101281010.1371/journal.pcbi.1012810Repeated games with partner choice.Christopher GraserTakako Fujiwara-GreveJulián GarcíaMatthijs van VeelenRepetition is a classic mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The standard way to study repeated games is to assume that there is an exogenous probability with which every interaction is repeated. If it is sufficiently likely that interactions are repeated, then reciprocity and cooperation can evolve together in repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Who individuals interact with can however also be under their control, or at least to some degree. If we change the standard model so that it allows for individuals to terminate the interaction with their current partner, and find someone else to play their prisoner's dilemmas with, then this limits the effectiveness of disciplining each other within the partnership, as one can always leave to escape punishment. The option to leave can however also be used to get away from someone who is not cooperating, which also has a disciplining effect. We find that the net effect of introducing the option to leave on cooperation is positive; with the option to leave, the average amount of cooperation that evolves in simulations is substantially higher than without. One of the reasons for this increase in cooperation is that partner choice creates endogenous phenotypic assortment. Compared to the standard models for the co-evolution of reciprocity and cooperation, and models of kin selection, our model thereby produces a better match with many forms of human cooperation in repeated settings. Individuals in our model end up interacting, not with random others that they cannot separate from, once matched, or with others that they are genetically related to, but with partners that they choose to stay with, and that are similarly dependable not to play defect as they are themselves.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012810 |
| spellingShingle | Christopher Graser Takako Fujiwara-Greve Julián García Matthijs van Veelen Repeated games with partner choice. PLoS Computational Biology |
| title | Repeated games with partner choice. |
| title_full | Repeated games with partner choice. |
| title_fullStr | Repeated games with partner choice. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Repeated games with partner choice. |
| title_short | Repeated games with partner choice. |
| title_sort | repeated games with partner choice |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012810 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT christophergraser repeatedgameswithpartnerchoice AT takakofujiwaragreve repeatedgameswithpartnerchoice AT juliangarcia repeatedgameswithpartnerchoice AT matthijsvanveelen repeatedgameswithpartnerchoice |