Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer
Government subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory...
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Main Authors: | Zi-yuan Zhang, Duan-xiang Fu, Qing Zhou |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2020-01-01
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Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/9610503 |
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