Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer
Government subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2020-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/9610503 |
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| author | Zi-yuan Zhang Duan-xiang Fu Qing Zhou |
| author_facet | Zi-yuan Zhang Duan-xiang Fu Qing Zhou |
| author_sort | Zi-yuan Zhang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Government subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory to construct game models by taking the product green degree, wholesale price and retail price as the decision variables, then we work out the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer under four decision scenarios, and reveal the impact differences between the two parties’ fairness preference behaviors. Our research mainly has the following findings: Firstly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer can benefit these two parties and can have certain impact on the optimal decisions only by working with the green product market expansion efficiency. Secondly, these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors can cause serious damage to the other party’s profit and the overall profit of green supply chain, and increase the rate of their own profit in the overall profit of green supply chain, but the difference is that the retailer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater decline in product green degree and wholesale price, and when certain conditions are met, its own profit may rise compared to its fairness neutral, while the manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater damage to the overall profit of green supply chainand make its own profit always be lower than its fairness neutral. Thirdly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer and the fairness preference behaviors of both parties can cause a stack effect on the optimal solutions, which means that the subsidy government provides for the manufacturer can aggravate the negative influence caused by these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-5418990e97774996a82bd14e8d4c078e |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-5418990e97774996a82bd14e8d4c078e2025-02-03T01:05:17ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2020-01-01202010.1155/2020/96105039610503Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the ManufacturerZi-yuan Zhang0Duan-xiang Fu1Qing Zhou2School of Business Administration, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454000, ChinaSchool of Business Administration, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454000, ChinaCapital Construction Department, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454000, ChinaGovernment subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory to construct game models by taking the product green degree, wholesale price and retail price as the decision variables, then we work out the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer under four decision scenarios, and reveal the impact differences between the two parties’ fairness preference behaviors. Our research mainly has the following findings: Firstly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer can benefit these two parties and can have certain impact on the optimal decisions only by working with the green product market expansion efficiency. Secondly, these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors can cause serious damage to the other party’s profit and the overall profit of green supply chain, and increase the rate of their own profit in the overall profit of green supply chain, but the difference is that the retailer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater decline in product green degree and wholesale price, and when certain conditions are met, its own profit may rise compared to its fairness neutral, while the manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater damage to the overall profit of green supply chainand make its own profit always be lower than its fairness neutral. Thirdly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer and the fairness preference behaviors of both parties can cause a stack effect on the optimal solutions, which means that the subsidy government provides for the manufacturer can aggravate the negative influence caused by these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/9610503 |
| spellingShingle | Zi-yuan Zhang Duan-xiang Fu Qing Zhou Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer |
| title_full | Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer |
| title_fullStr | Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer |
| title_short | Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer |
| title_sort | optimal decisions of a green supply chain under the joint action of fairness preference and subsidy to the manufacturer |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/9610503 |
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