Patterns, noise, and Beliefs

In “Real Patterns” Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett’s analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone b...

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Main Author: Lajos Ludovic Brons
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2019-04-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Online Access:https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/58103
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author Lajos Ludovic Brons
author_facet Lajos Ludovic Brons
author_sort Lajos Ludovic Brons
collection DOAJ
description In “Real Patterns” Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett’s analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or “noisiness” of what someone believes, and the same belief can be described by different sentences or propositions (which is illustrated by Dennett’s analogy, some Gettier cases, and Frege’s puzzle), but in some contexts some of these competing descriptions are misleading or even false. Faithful (or truthful) description must be guided by a principle (or principles) related to the principle of charity: belief descriptions should not attribute irrationality to the believer or have other kinds of “deviant” implications.
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spelling doaj-art-53a33f5a464e4e98a006c18beca07ec22025-08-20T02:24:30ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1808-17112019-04-0123110.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n1p1932210Patterns, noise, and BeliefsLajos Ludovic Brons0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0890-5678Nihon University & Lakeland University In “Real Patterns” Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett’s analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or “noisiness” of what someone believes, and the same belief can be described by different sentences or propositions (which is illustrated by Dennett’s analogy, some Gettier cases, and Frege’s puzzle), but in some contexts some of these competing descriptions are misleading or even false. Faithful (or truthful) description must be guided by a principle (or principles) related to the principle of charity: belief descriptions should not attribute irrationality to the believer or have other kinds of “deviant” implications. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/58103
spellingShingle Lajos Ludovic Brons
Patterns, noise, and Beliefs
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
title Patterns, noise, and Beliefs
title_full Patterns, noise, and Beliefs
title_fullStr Patterns, noise, and Beliefs
title_full_unstemmed Patterns, noise, and Beliefs
title_short Patterns, noise, and Beliefs
title_sort patterns noise and beliefs
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/58103
work_keys_str_mv AT lajosludovicbrons patternsnoiseandbeliefs