Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements
Reasons-based accounts of our normative conclusions face difficulties in distinguishing between what ought to be done and what is required. This article addresses this problem from a formal perspective. I introduce a rudimentary formalization of a reasons-based account and demonstrate that that the...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Michigan Publishing
2021-10-01
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| Series: | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| Online Access: | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1119/ |
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| _version_ | 1850066614898130944 |
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| author | Robert Mullins |
| author_facet | Robert Mullins |
| author_sort | Robert Mullins |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Reasons-based accounts of our normative conclusions face difficulties in distinguishing between what ought to be done and what is required. This article addresses this problem from a formal perspective. I introduce a rudimentary formalization of a reasons-based account and demonstrate that that the model faces difficulties in accounting for the distinction between oughts and requirements. I briefly critique attempts to distinguish between oughts and requirements by appealing to a difference in strength or weight of reasons. I then present a formalized reasons-based account of permissions, oughts and requirements. The model exploits Joshua Gert (2004; 2007) and Patricia Greenspan’s (2005; 2007; 2010) suggestion that some reasons perform a purely justificatory function. I show that the model preserves the standard entailment relationships between requirements, oughts and permissions. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-4fec3494141c46c29a0ede67e4815c65 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2330-4014 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-10-01 |
| publisher | Michigan Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-4fec3494141c46c29a0ede67e4815c652025-08-20T02:48:41ZengMichigan PublishingErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy2330-40142021-10-017010.3998/ergo.1119Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and RequirementsRobert Mullins0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5935-8774The University of QueenslandReasons-based accounts of our normative conclusions face difficulties in distinguishing between what ought to be done and what is required. This article addresses this problem from a formal perspective. I introduce a rudimentary formalization of a reasons-based account and demonstrate that that the model faces difficulties in accounting for the distinction between oughts and requirements. I briefly critique attempts to distinguish between oughts and requirements by appealing to a difference in strength or weight of reasons. I then present a formalized reasons-based account of permissions, oughts and requirements. The model exploits Joshua Gert (2004; 2007) and Patricia Greenspan’s (2005; 2007; 2010) suggestion that some reasons perform a purely justificatory function. I show that the model preserves the standard entailment relationships between requirements, oughts and permissions.https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1119/ |
| spellingShingle | Robert Mullins Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| title | Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements |
| title_full | Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements |
| title_fullStr | Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements |
| title_full_unstemmed | Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements |
| title_short | Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements |
| title_sort | formalizing reasons oughts and requirements |
| url | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1119/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT robertmullins formalizingreasonsoughtsandrequirements |