Knowledge, reason, noumenon: The rational legitimacy of religious belief and meta-empirical thought in the light of Kant's critique of Pure Reason

The objective of this contribution is to present a counterargument to the view that religious faith is inherently incompatible with reason due to its lack of scientific evidence. To this end, it will draw upon the insights of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It will be demonstrated that...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Marchegiani Giulio
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Philosophy 2024-01-01
Series:Belgrade Philosophical Annual
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Online Access:https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912402229M.pdf
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Summary:The objective of this contribution is to present a counterargument to the view that religious faith is inherently incompatible with reason due to its lack of scientific evidence. To this end, it will draw upon the insights of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It will be demonstrated that the distinction between the meta-empirical sphere and that of the scientific understanding does not imply the irrationality of the former for Kant. This is because, while reason encompasses understanding, it is not constrained by it. On the contrary, defining the boundaries of the sphere accessible to scientific investigation implies recognising the space outside those boundaries, the definition of which is made possible by the operational instrument of noumenon. While this result does not contradict scientific reason, it does allow the boundaries of the two spheres to be defined in a non-conflicting way and implies that the metaempirical sphere is a legitimate area of endeavor. The result of these considerations is to demonstrate that any stance which, in the name of a misconceived scientificity, denies in principle any possible metascientific or religious perspective on reality, is ultimately unreasonable. Rather, such a stance is based on implicit metaphysical assumptions.
ISSN:0353-3891
2956-0357