Objective List Theory of Well-Being as an Explanatory Theory.
Generally it is argued that the Objective List Theory (OLT) cannot support an explanatory view of what well-being is because OLT cannot identify one single good-maker property that it is responsible for unifying all the element that compose well-being. Then, Objective List Theory only can be an enu...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2015-09-01
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| Series: | Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/41550 |
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| author | Bruno Aislã Gonçalves Santos |
| author_facet | Bruno Aislã Gonçalves Santos |
| author_sort | Bruno Aislã Gonçalves Santos |
| collection | DOAJ |
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Generally it is argued that the Objective List Theory (OLT) cannot support an explanatory view of what well-being is because OLT cannot identify one single good-maker property that it is responsible for unifying all the element that compose well-being. Then, Objective List Theory only can be an enumerative view of well-being. In this paper, I aim hold that we may offer an explanatory view of well-being even without identify a single good-maker property that is shared by all the elements that compose well-being. I hold that the OLT is still explanatory, because it is possible to identify each good-maker property in each element that is supposed to compose the list that is responsible for defining what well-being is. In addition, I hold that in order to have a full explanation about the concept of well-being we need to keep separate two question: 1) why something is good intrinsically and; 2) How the things that are good intrinsically could benefit us. My conclusion is that we may conceive one explanatory and pluralistic list that having constitutive elements of well-being and that a good explanation of well-being should keep separating the two question listed above.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-4d4349df89bc401dbf9e59828989bf5c |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 1677-2954 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2015-09-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-4d4349df89bc401dbf9e59828989bf5c2025-08-20T01:53:36ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaEthic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy1677-29542015-09-0114310.5007/1677-2954.2015v14n3p45125671Objective List Theory of Well-Being as an Explanatory Theory.Bruno Aislã Gonçalves Santos0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9866-5275Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina Generally it is argued that the Objective List Theory (OLT) cannot support an explanatory view of what well-being is because OLT cannot identify one single good-maker property that it is responsible for unifying all the element that compose well-being. Then, Objective List Theory only can be an enumerative view of well-being. In this paper, I aim hold that we may offer an explanatory view of well-being even without identify a single good-maker property that is shared by all the elements that compose well-being. I hold that the OLT is still explanatory, because it is possible to identify each good-maker property in each element that is supposed to compose the list that is responsible for defining what well-being is. In addition, I hold that in order to have a full explanation about the concept of well-being we need to keep separate two question: 1) why something is good intrinsically and; 2) How the things that are good intrinsically could benefit us. My conclusion is that we may conceive one explanatory and pluralistic list that having constitutive elements of well-being and that a good explanation of well-being should keep separating the two question listed above. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/41550 |
| spellingShingle | Bruno Aislã Gonçalves Santos Objective List Theory of Well-Being as an Explanatory Theory. Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy |
| title | Objective List Theory of Well-Being as an Explanatory Theory. |
| title_full | Objective List Theory of Well-Being as an Explanatory Theory. |
| title_fullStr | Objective List Theory of Well-Being as an Explanatory Theory. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Objective List Theory of Well-Being as an Explanatory Theory. |
| title_short | Objective List Theory of Well-Being as an Explanatory Theory. |
| title_sort | objective list theory of well being as an explanatory theory |
| url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/41550 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT brunoaislagoncalvessantos objectivelisttheoryofwellbeingasanexplanatorytheory |