Contracts Adjustment under Bilateral Information Updating in a Supply Chain
This paper investigates contracts adjustment between one manufacturer and one retailer under bilateral information updating. The manufacturer incurs uncertain production cost and the retailer faces uncertain demand, but they can acquire independent signals to update production cost and demand, respe...
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Main Authors: | Xinhui Wang, Yingsheng Su, Zihan Zhou, Yiling Fang |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2020-01-01
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Series: | Complexity |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/1040658 |
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