How social reinforcement learning can lead to metastable polarisation and the voter model.
Previous explanations for the persistence of polarization of opinions have typically included modelling assumptions that predispose the possibility of polarization (i.e., assumptions allowing a pair of agents to drift apart in their opinion such as repulsive interactions or bounded confidence). An e...
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| Main Authors: | Benedikt V Meylahn, Janusz M Meylahn |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2024-01-01
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| Series: | PLoS ONE |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0313951 |
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