What Is Non-Naturalism?
Metaethicists often specify non-naturalism in different ways: some take it to be about identity, while others take it to be about grounding. But few directly address the taxonomical question of what the best way to understand non-naturalism is. That’s the task of this paper. This isn’t a merely term...
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Michigan Publishing
2022-12-01
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| Series: | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| Online Access: | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/2253/ |
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| author | Stephanie Leary |
| author_facet | Stephanie Leary |
| author_sort | Stephanie Leary |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Metaethicists often specify non-naturalism in different ways: some take it to be about identity, while others take it to be about grounding. But few directly address the taxonomical question of what the best way to understand non-naturalism is. That’s the task of this paper. This isn’t a merely terminological question about how to use the term “non-naturalism”, but a substantive philosophical one about what metaphysical ideology we need to capture the pre-theoretical concerns of non-naturalists. I argue that, contrary to popular opinion, non-naturalism is best characterized not in terms of identity or grounding, but in terms of essence. First, I lay out some desiderata for a good characterization of non-naturalism: it should (i) speak to and elucidate the non-naturalist’s core pre-theoretical commitments, (ii) render non-naturalism a substantive, local claim about normativity, and (iii) provide the most general characterization of the view possible (iv) in a way that best fits the spirit of paradigm non-naturalist views. I then argue that identity characterizations fail to satisfy the former two desiderata, while grounding characterizations at best don’t satisfy the latter two. So, I propose a new essence characterization of non-naturalism and argue that it does a better job of satisfying all four desiderata. Moreover, I argue that this essence characterization has important implications for both metaethical and metaphysical theorizing. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-47a01e2d7a7b4934826ce4bc76b5ba55 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2330-4014 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2022-12-01 |
| publisher | Michigan Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-47a01e2d7a7b4934826ce4bc76b5ba552025-08-20T02:13:24ZengMichigan PublishingErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy2330-40142022-12-018010.3998/ergo.2253What Is Non-Naturalism?Stephanie Leary0N/AMetaethicists often specify non-naturalism in different ways: some take it to be about identity, while others take it to be about grounding. But few directly address the taxonomical question of what the best way to understand non-naturalism is. That’s the task of this paper. This isn’t a merely terminological question about how to use the term “non-naturalism”, but a substantive philosophical one about what metaphysical ideology we need to capture the pre-theoretical concerns of non-naturalists. I argue that, contrary to popular opinion, non-naturalism is best characterized not in terms of identity or grounding, but in terms of essence. First, I lay out some desiderata for a good characterization of non-naturalism: it should (i) speak to and elucidate the non-naturalist’s core pre-theoretical commitments, (ii) render non-naturalism a substantive, local claim about normativity, and (iii) provide the most general characterization of the view possible (iv) in a way that best fits the spirit of paradigm non-naturalist views. I then argue that identity characterizations fail to satisfy the former two desiderata, while grounding characterizations at best don’t satisfy the latter two. So, I propose a new essence characterization of non-naturalism and argue that it does a better job of satisfying all four desiderata. Moreover, I argue that this essence characterization has important implications for both metaethical and metaphysical theorizing.https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/2253/ |
| spellingShingle | Stephanie Leary What Is Non-Naturalism? Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| title | What Is Non-Naturalism? |
| title_full | What Is Non-Naturalism? |
| title_fullStr | What Is Non-Naturalism? |
| title_full_unstemmed | What Is Non-Naturalism? |
| title_short | What Is Non-Naturalism? |
| title_sort | what is non naturalism |
| url | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/2253/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT stephanieleary whatisnonnaturalism |