Newman and Wittgenstein on the Will to Believe: Quasi-Fideism and the Ground of Religious Certainty
In this article, I argue that Newman’s emphasis on a gestaltic model of reasoning and the role played by the imagination in informal reasoning is a fruitful starting point for an exploration of convergence between the <i>Grammar of Assent</i> and Wittgenstein’s <i>On Certainty</...
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2025-02-01
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| author | Modesto Gómez-Alonso |
| author_facet | Modesto Gómez-Alonso |
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| description | In this article, I argue that Newman’s emphasis on a gestaltic model of reasoning and the role played by the imagination in informal reasoning is a fruitful starting point for an exploration of convergence between the <i>Grammar of Assent</i> and Wittgenstein’s <i>On Certainty</i>. I claim that Wittgenstein, like Newman, challenges both the claim that justification must be neutral and the prejudice according to which any form of persuasion that is not demonstrative is irrational or arational. Arguments are mainly focused on the picture of Newman’s epistemology provided lately by Duncan Pritchard. I argue that Pritchard misrepresents Newman’s conception of the illative sense so as to ascribe to him the thesis that religious belief is evidentially grounded in a broad sense of evidence. This creates a false dichotomy between the arational view of religious principles and the account of religious certainties as epistemically grounded. I suggest that Newman’s reference to both living persuasion and the role played by the will in religious conviction is part of his attempt to expose this false dichotomy. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-45cdf4de4f024576bc8481da8ac4cac6 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2077-1444 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-02-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Religions |
| spelling | doaj-art-45cdf4de4f024576bc8481da8ac4cac62025-08-20T02:44:39ZengMDPI AGReligions2077-14442025-02-0116217410.3390/rel16020174Newman and Wittgenstein on the Will to Believe: Quasi-Fideism and the Ground of Religious CertaintyModesto Gómez-Alonso0Department of Metaphysics and Current Trends in Philosophy, Ethics and Political Philosophy, University of Seville, 41004 Sevilla, SpainIn this article, I argue that Newman’s emphasis on a gestaltic model of reasoning and the role played by the imagination in informal reasoning is a fruitful starting point for an exploration of convergence between the <i>Grammar of Assent</i> and Wittgenstein’s <i>On Certainty</i>. I claim that Wittgenstein, like Newman, challenges both the claim that justification must be neutral and the prejudice according to which any form of persuasion that is not demonstrative is irrational or arational. Arguments are mainly focused on the picture of Newman’s epistemology provided lately by Duncan Pritchard. I argue that Pritchard misrepresents Newman’s conception of the illative sense so as to ascribe to him the thesis that religious belief is evidentially grounded in a broad sense of evidence. This creates a false dichotomy between the arational view of religious principles and the account of religious certainties as epistemically grounded. I suggest that Newman’s reference to both living persuasion and the role played by the will in religious conviction is part of his attempt to expose this false dichotomy.https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/16/2/174NewmanPritchardWittgensteinassentethics of beliefhinge epistemology |
| spellingShingle | Modesto Gómez-Alonso Newman and Wittgenstein on the Will to Believe: Quasi-Fideism and the Ground of Religious Certainty Religions Newman Pritchard Wittgenstein assent ethics of belief hinge epistemology |
| title | Newman and Wittgenstein on the Will to Believe: Quasi-Fideism and the Ground of Religious Certainty |
| title_full | Newman and Wittgenstein on the Will to Believe: Quasi-Fideism and the Ground of Religious Certainty |
| title_fullStr | Newman and Wittgenstein on the Will to Believe: Quasi-Fideism and the Ground of Religious Certainty |
| title_full_unstemmed | Newman and Wittgenstein on the Will to Believe: Quasi-Fideism and the Ground of Religious Certainty |
| title_short | Newman and Wittgenstein on the Will to Believe: Quasi-Fideism and the Ground of Religious Certainty |
| title_sort | newman and wittgenstein on the will to believe quasi fideism and the ground of religious certainty |
| topic | Newman Pritchard Wittgenstein assent ethics of belief hinge epistemology |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/16/2/174 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT modestogomezalonso newmanandwittgensteinonthewilltobelievequasifideismandthegroundofreligiouscertainty |