The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System
Although the ability to manage public health emergencies in China has improved significantly, there are still many challenges to the existing information transmission mechanism in pandemic early warning systems. In this context, a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of the local government,...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2022-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/5796428 |
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| _version_ | 1850110632002584576 |
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| author | Feng Cao Ling Zhang Yihan Wu |
| author_facet | Feng Cao Ling Zhang Yihan Wu |
| author_sort | Feng Cao |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Although the ability to manage public health emergencies in China has improved significantly, there are still many challenges to the existing information transmission mechanism in pandemic early warning systems. In this context, a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of the local government, the whistleblower, and the public is formulated. By using Matlab, the dynamic evolution path of the game model is stimulated under different conditions. Stable strategies for an early warning system for public health emergencies are also explored. The results indicate that the cost of whistleblowing, the cost of response, and the benefit of attention significantly influence strategic decisions among three parties. This study highlights the importance of whistleblowing in managing public health emergencies. Yet, our findings provide theoretical support for policy recommendations for promoting public health emergency preparedness. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-4492d75edc2042d7ae22eecf3728fc3d |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2022-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-4492d75edc2042d7ae22eecf3728fc3d2025-08-20T02:37:48ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1607-887X2022-01-01202210.1155/2022/5796428The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning SystemFeng Cao0Ling Zhang1Yihan Wu2School of Economics and ManagementSchool of Economics and ManagementSchool of Social DevelopmentAlthough the ability to manage public health emergencies in China has improved significantly, there are still many challenges to the existing information transmission mechanism in pandemic early warning systems. In this context, a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of the local government, the whistleblower, and the public is formulated. By using Matlab, the dynamic evolution path of the game model is stimulated under different conditions. Stable strategies for an early warning system for public health emergencies are also explored. The results indicate that the cost of whistleblowing, the cost of response, and the benefit of attention significantly influence strategic decisions among three parties. This study highlights the importance of whistleblowing in managing public health emergencies. Yet, our findings provide theoretical support for policy recommendations for promoting public health emergency preparedness.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/5796428 |
| spellingShingle | Feng Cao Ling Zhang Yihan Wu The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System |
| title_full | The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System |
| title_fullStr | The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System |
| title_short | The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System |
| title_sort | whistleblower s dilemma an evolutionary game analysis of the public health early warning system |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/5796428 |
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