On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining

This paper argues against the view, proposed in Langland-Hassan (2020), that attitudinal imaginings are reducible to basic folk-psychological attitudes such as judgments, beliefs, desires, decisions, or combinations thereof. The proposed reduction fails because attitudinal imaginings, though similar...

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Main Author: Alon Chasid
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Michigan Publishing 2025-04-01
Series:Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/7430/
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author Alon Chasid
author_facet Alon Chasid
author_sort Alon Chasid
collection DOAJ
description This paper argues against the view, proposed in Langland-Hassan (2020), that attitudinal imaginings are reducible to basic folk-psychological attitudes such as judgments, beliefs, desires, decisions, or combinations thereof. The proposed reduction fails because attitudinal imaginings, though similar to basic attitudes in certain respects, function differently than basic attitudes. I demonstrate this by exploring two types of cases: spontaneous imaginings, and imaginings that arise in response to fiction, showing that in these cases, imaginings cannot be identified with basic attitudes. I conclude that imagining is a distinct attitude: it enables us to freely conjure up scenarios without being bound by the restrictions that govern basic folk-psychological attitudes.
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spelling doaj-art-435b3c5b59eb4cd591efd578f04d69262025-08-20T02:09:08ZengMichigan PublishingErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy2330-40142025-04-0112010.3998/ergo.7430On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal ImaginingAlon ChasidThis paper argues against the view, proposed in Langland-Hassan (2020), that attitudinal imaginings are reducible to basic folk-psychological attitudes such as judgments, beliefs, desires, decisions, or combinations thereof. The proposed reduction fails because attitudinal imaginings, though similar to basic attitudes in certain respects, function differently than basic attitudes. I demonstrate this by exploring two types of cases: spontaneous imaginings, and imaginings that arise in response to fiction, showing that in these cases, imaginings cannot be identified with basic attitudes. I conclude that imagining is a distinct attitude: it enables us to freely conjure up scenarios without being bound by the restrictions that govern basic folk-psychological attitudes.https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/7430/imaginationreductionismfolk psychologyfictiondaydreamingemotions
spellingShingle Alon Chasid
On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining
Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
imagination
reductionism
folk psychology
fiction
daydreaming
emotions
title On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining
title_full On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining
title_fullStr On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining
title_full_unstemmed On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining
title_short On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining
title_sort on the irreducibility of attitudinal imagining
topic imagination
reductionism
folk psychology
fiction
daydreaming
emotions
url https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/7430/
work_keys_str_mv AT alonchasid ontheirreducibilityofattitudinalimagining