On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining
This paper argues against the view, proposed in Langland-Hassan (2020), that attitudinal imaginings are reducible to basic folk-psychological attitudes such as judgments, beliefs, desires, decisions, or combinations thereof. The proposed reduction fails because attitudinal imaginings, though similar...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Michigan Publishing
2025-04-01
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| Series: | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/7430/ |
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| Summary: | This paper argues against the view, proposed in Langland-Hassan (2020), that attitudinal imaginings are reducible to basic folk-psychological attitudes such as judgments, beliefs, desires, decisions, or combinations thereof. The proposed reduction fails because attitudinal imaginings, though similar to basic attitudes in certain respects, function differently than basic attitudes. I demonstrate this by exploring two types of cases: spontaneous imaginings, and imaginings that arise in response to fiction, showing that in these cases, imaginings cannot be identified with basic attitudes. I conclude that imagining is a distinct attitude: it enables us to freely conjure up scenarios without being bound by the restrictions that govern basic folk-psychological attitudes. |
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| ISSN: | 2330-4014 |