Descartes' demon and his powers: The break with medieval demonology
In contemporary scholarship, Descartes' Demon has been often treated as a thought experiment with no connection to the world and the views of the 17th century. This rather anachronistic take has been challenged, with some attempting to interpret it within a broader historical Christian context...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Philosophy
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Belgrade Philosophical Annual |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912402139R.pdf |
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| Summary: | In contemporary scholarship, Descartes' Demon has been often treated as a thought experiment with no connection to the world and the views of the 17th century. This rather anachronistic take has been challenged, with some attempting to interpret it within a broader historical Christian context (e.g., Scarre 1990). The most recent challenge has come from scholars focusing on Teresa de Ávila's work (Mercer 2016; Forsman 2023), notably her Inner Castle, as it likely had a profound influence on Descartes. Our goal is to show how radically new Descartes' idea of a demon was despite its historical continuity and the apparent influences of monastic literature. We first outline the ontological status of demons and their ways of deception from late Antiquity to Teresa de Ávila and Descartes. Then, we turn to Descartes' Demon and the differences between Descartes' account and traditional ones. While traditional accounts point towards the moral domain (e.g., the ways demons influence humans and the ways we can negate the influence), Descartes' Demon has the purpose of endangering all knowledge. Therefore, Descartes, unlike Teresa de Ávila and other traditional authors, needs a deceiver far more powerful than any demon in the Christian tradition. The attribution of omnipotence to a demon, if only for theoretical purposes, represents a huge break with traditional Christian demonology. Finally, by comparing the Descartes' Demon with the brain-in-a-vat skeptical scenario, we establish two conclusions: (1) the possibility of such a demon represents the most radical form of skepticism, whereas the brain-in-a-vat scenario is less extreme; and (2) these thought experiments demonstrate how underlying metaphysical and theological frameworks shape the formulation of these scenarios and how far they can reach. |
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| ISSN: | 0353-3891 2956-0357 |