OT-PCA: New Key-Recovery Plaintext-Checking Oracle Based Side-Channel Attacks on HQC with Offline Templates
In this paper, we introduce OT-PCA, a novel approach for conducting Plaintext-Checking (PC) oracle based side-channel attacks, specifically designed for Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC). By calling the publicly accessible HQC decoder, we build offline templates that enable efficient extraction of soft in...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Ruhr-Universität Bochum
2024-12-01
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| Series: | Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems |
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| Online Access: | https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11929 |
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| author | Haiyue Dong Qian Guo |
| author_facet | Haiyue Dong Qian Guo |
| author_sort | Haiyue Dong |
| collection | DOAJ |
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In this paper, we introduce OT-PCA, a novel approach for conducting Plaintext-Checking (PC) oracle based side-channel attacks, specifically designed for Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC). By calling the publicly accessible HQC decoder, we build offline templates that enable efficient extraction of soft information for hundreds of secret positions with just a single PC oracle call. Our method addresses critical challenges in optimizing key-related information extraction, including maximizing decryption output entropy and ensuring error pattern independence, through the use of genetic-style algorithms.
Extensive simulations demonstrate that our new attack method significantly reduces the required number of oracle calls, achieving a 2.4-fold decrease for hqc-128 and even greater reductions for hqc-192 and hqc-256 compared to current state-of-the-art methods. Notably, the attack shows strong resilience against inaccuracy in the PC oracle—when the oracle accuracy decreases to 95%, the reduction factor in oracle call requirements increases to 7.6 for hqc-128.
Lastly, a real-world evaluation conducted using power analysis on a platform with an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller validates the practical applicability and effectiveness of our approach.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-42e61eb45cd741a8a17c22042d3748cb |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2569-2925 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-12-01 |
| publisher | Ruhr-Universität Bochum |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems |
| spelling | doaj-art-42e61eb45cd741a8a17c22042d3748cb2025-08-20T01:54:50ZengRuhr-Universität BochumTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems2569-29252024-12-012025110.46586/tches.v2025.i1.251-274OT-PCA: New Key-Recovery Plaintext-Checking Oracle Based Side-Channel Attacks on HQC with Offline TemplatesHaiyue Dong0Qian Guo1Independent Researcher, Lund, SwedenLund University, Lund, Sweden In this paper, we introduce OT-PCA, a novel approach for conducting Plaintext-Checking (PC) oracle based side-channel attacks, specifically designed for Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC). By calling the publicly accessible HQC decoder, we build offline templates that enable efficient extraction of soft information for hundreds of secret positions with just a single PC oracle call. Our method addresses critical challenges in optimizing key-related information extraction, including maximizing decryption output entropy and ensuring error pattern independence, through the use of genetic-style algorithms. Extensive simulations demonstrate that our new attack method significantly reduces the required number of oracle calls, achieving a 2.4-fold decrease for hqc-128 and even greater reductions for hqc-192 and hqc-256 compared to current state-of-the-art methods. Notably, the attack shows strong resilience against inaccuracy in the PC oracle—when the oracle accuracy decreases to 95%, the reduction factor in oracle call requirements increases to 7.6 for hqc-128. Lastly, a real-world evaluation conducted using power analysis on a platform with an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller validates the practical applicability and effectiveness of our approach. https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11929Code-based cryptographyNIST post-quantum cryptography standardizationHQCSide-channel attacksKEM |
| spellingShingle | Haiyue Dong Qian Guo OT-PCA: New Key-Recovery Plaintext-Checking Oracle Based Side-Channel Attacks on HQC with Offline Templates Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Code-based cryptography NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization HQC Side-channel attacks KEM |
| title | OT-PCA: New Key-Recovery Plaintext-Checking Oracle Based Side-Channel Attacks on HQC with Offline Templates |
| title_full | OT-PCA: New Key-Recovery Plaintext-Checking Oracle Based Side-Channel Attacks on HQC with Offline Templates |
| title_fullStr | OT-PCA: New Key-Recovery Plaintext-Checking Oracle Based Side-Channel Attacks on HQC with Offline Templates |
| title_full_unstemmed | OT-PCA: New Key-Recovery Plaintext-Checking Oracle Based Side-Channel Attacks on HQC with Offline Templates |
| title_short | OT-PCA: New Key-Recovery Plaintext-Checking Oracle Based Side-Channel Attacks on HQC with Offline Templates |
| title_sort | ot pca new key recovery plaintext checking oracle based side channel attacks on hqc with offline templates |
| topic | Code-based cryptography NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization HQC Side-channel attacks KEM |
| url | https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11929 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT haiyuedong otpcanewkeyrecoveryplaintextcheckingoraclebasedsidechannelattacksonhqcwithofflinetemplates AT qianguo otpcanewkeyrecoveryplaintextcheckingoraclebasedsidechannelattacksonhqcwithofflinetemplates |