Utility Firm Performance & Executive Compensation

Corporate governance remains a focal point for policymakers, investors, academics, and the public. While existing research has delved into the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and firm stock performance, the findings have been inconclusive. Notably, the investor-owned...

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Main Authors: Ted Peterson, Kaiyuan Yang, Chenxi Lin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: SAGE Publishing 2025-03-01
Series:SAGE Open
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440251327538
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author Ted Peterson
Kaiyuan Yang
Chenxi Lin
author_facet Ted Peterson
Kaiyuan Yang
Chenxi Lin
author_sort Ted Peterson
collection DOAJ
description Corporate governance remains a focal point for policymakers, investors, academics, and the public. While existing research has delved into the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and firm stock performance, the findings have been inconclusive. Notably, the investor-owned public utilities sector faces distinct governance challenges due to private and public pressures. In this study, we examine CEO pay within publicly traded large-cap U.S. utilities from 2016 to 2020, aiming to gauge performance. Our research design incorporates statistical procedures involving correlations and t-tests to analyze these relationships comprehensively. Over the specified period, the utility industry generally underperformed the S&P 500 benchmark. Our findings affirm a positive correlation between CEO compensation and stock performance providing both practical and scholarly implications. Particularly, an increase in CEO total compensation corresponds to improved stock performance. Additionally, we identify significant associations between CEO pay increments and the firm's performance relative to the utility index (VPU). We advocate for further investigation to validate these relationships across diverse time frames and even industries, emphasizing their significance.
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issn 2158-2440
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spelling doaj-art-4214e7bfb21248d297ef8bedcef809122025-08-20T03:14:59ZengSAGE PublishingSAGE Open2158-24402025-03-011510.1177/21582440251327538Utility Firm Performance & Executive CompensationTed Peterson0Kaiyuan Yang1Chenxi Lin2 University of North Texas, Denton, TX, USA University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USACorporate governance remains a focal point for policymakers, investors, academics, and the public. While existing research has delved into the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and firm stock performance, the findings have been inconclusive. Notably, the investor-owned public utilities sector faces distinct governance challenges due to private and public pressures. In this study, we examine CEO pay within publicly traded large-cap U.S. utilities from 2016 to 2020, aiming to gauge performance. Our research design incorporates statistical procedures involving correlations and t-tests to analyze these relationships comprehensively. Over the specified period, the utility industry generally underperformed the S&P 500 benchmark. Our findings affirm a positive correlation between CEO compensation and stock performance providing both practical and scholarly implications. Particularly, an increase in CEO total compensation corresponds to improved stock performance. Additionally, we identify significant associations between CEO pay increments and the firm's performance relative to the utility index (VPU). We advocate for further investigation to validate these relationships across diverse time frames and even industries, emphasizing their significance.https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440251327538
spellingShingle Ted Peterson
Kaiyuan Yang
Chenxi Lin
Utility Firm Performance & Executive Compensation
SAGE Open
title Utility Firm Performance & Executive Compensation
title_full Utility Firm Performance & Executive Compensation
title_fullStr Utility Firm Performance & Executive Compensation
title_full_unstemmed Utility Firm Performance & Executive Compensation
title_short Utility Firm Performance & Executive Compensation
title_sort utility firm performance executive compensation
url https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440251327538
work_keys_str_mv AT tedpeterson utilityfirmperformanceexecutivecompensation
AT kaiyuanyang utilityfirmperformanceexecutivecompensation
AT chenxilin utilityfirmperformanceexecutivecompensation